A Government Servant Cannot Be Sent on Deputation Without Consent

The petitioner, a Deputy Ranger, was promoted on 1 January 2022.

He was initially sent on deputation from Forest Division, Dantewada, to District Union, Bijapur, by order dated 20 January 2022.

That order was modified on 1 February 2022, posting him to District Union, Dantewada, where he resumed duty.

On 13 April 2022, the authorities again modified the arrangement and directed his deputation to District Union, Sukma; he was simultaneously relieved from District Union, Dantewada.

The petitioner challenged the deputation and relieving orders, contending that they were issued without his consent and transferred him outside the district.

An interim order was granted in his favour on 21 April 2022 and remained operative during the proceedings.

The State argued that the petitioner’s consent was not required under Fundamental Rule 110.

1. Whether the petitioner could be sent on deputation to District Union, Sukma without obtaining his consent.

2. Whether the deputation order dated 13 April 2022 and the consequential relieving order were legally sustainable in the absence of a consensual arrangement between the lending authority, borrowing authority, and the petitioner.

The Court applied the settled service-law principle that deputation is a consensual, tripartite arrangement involving the lending employer, borrowing employer, and employee, and that an employee cannot ordinarily be sent on deputation without consent.

Relying on State of Punjab v. Inder Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 372, the Court held that deputation means temporary service outside the employee’s cadre or parent department and requires the employee’s consent.

It further relied on Umapati Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (1999) 4 SCC 659, which recognised deputation as involving the voluntary decision of the lending authority, acceptance by the borrowing authority, and consent of the employee.

The Court also referred to Union of India v. S.N. Maity, (2015) 4 SCC 164, and Ms. Sarita Singh v. M/s Shree Infosoft Private Limited, Civil Appeal No. 346 of 2022, for the proposition that deputation has a specific legal meaning and cannot be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously.

Although the State relied on Fundamental Rule 110, the Court found the absence of employee consent and any material showing a consensual arrangement decisive.

The Court treated the petitioner’s proposed posting to District Union, Sukma as deputation rather than an ordinary transfer.

Since deputation entails service outside the parent cadre or department and carries specific rights and obligations involving the lending and borrowing authorities, the petitioner’s consent was legally necessary.

The record disclosed neither the petitioner’s consent nor any material establishing a consensual arrangement between the relevant authorities.

The State’s reliance on Fundamental Rule 110 therefore did not overcome the fundamental requirement of consent applicable to deputation.

Consequently, the deputation order dated 13 April 2022 was held invalid, and the consequential relieving order was also unsustainable.

It quashed the deputation order dated 13 April 2022 and the consequential relieving order, i.e., Annexures P/1 and P/2.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed.

The interim order granted earlier was vacated.