A later failure to marry does not turn consensual sex between adults into rape absent proof of initial deception.

The appellant was convicted under Section 376(1) IPC and sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹25,000 by the Principal Sessions Judge, Pakur.

The prosecution case was that the complainant was taken to the appellant’s house on an assurance of marriage and had physical relations with him for about a year before he made her leave.

At trial, she additionally testified that he had chased her at a market, taken her to a field, and raped her.

The Medical Board assessed her age at 18–19 years; she also acknowledged that the appellant was recorded as her husband on her Aadhaar card.

The appellant appealed under Section 374(2) CrPC.

1. Whether the complainant’s evidence was reliable and trustworthy

2. Whether her consent to sexual intercourse was voluntary or given under a misconception of fact

3. Whether the prosecution proved the appellant’s guilt under Section 376 IPC beyond reasonable doubt

4. Whether the trial court erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant

Section 376 IPC criminalises rape, while Section 90 IPC concerns consent given under a misconception of fact.

Under State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, Raju v. State of M.P. and Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), a prosecutrix’s evidence may sustain conviction without corroboration if it inspires confidence; corroboration is a matter of prudence, not a legal requirement, and material infirmities may nevertheless make the evidence unreliable.

Under Uday v. State of Karnataka, consent to intercourse on a promise of future marriage does not, without more, establish consent under a misconception of fact; the court must assess the evidence and surrounding circumstances, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving every ingredient of the offence.

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and where the evidence reasonably permits competing views, the view favourable to the accused is to be adopted.

The Court found a material divergence between the complaint—which alleged that the appellant took the complainant to his house and had relations with her over a period of about a year—and her trial testimony introducing an allegation of rape in a field.

The Investigating Officer also testified that she had not made the field-rape allegation in her restatement.

The Court considered this improvement alongside evidence of a prior love relationship, the complainant’s adult age, and her admission that the appellant was recorded as her husband on her Aadhaar card.

It concluded that the evidence did not establish that the appellant induced her consent through a false promise of marriage from the outset; accordingly, the trial court’s finding of consent under a misconception of fact was unsupported.

In the Court’s view, the complainant’s testimony did not inspire sufficient confidence to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

It set aside the conviction and sentence dated 26 February 2018, allowed the appeal, and directed the appellant’s release forthwith unless required in another case.