A License Agreement terminable only for cause is not "inherently determinable" under Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act.

The Petitioner entered into a nine-year License Agreement with the Respondent (DMRC) on 14.08.2024 to develop and operate commercial spaces at three metro stations

The Petitioner allegedly failed to pay license fees and utility charges regularly, leading DMRC to issue multiple Cure and Termination Notices throughout 2024 and 2025

On 02.03.2026, DMRC issued an order terminating the License Agreement due to non-payment of dues and non-compliance with fire safety norms

The Petitioner filed this Section 9 petition seeking to stay the termination, restrain dispossession, and restore utility services, arguing that the termination was procedurally flawed and arbitrary

1. Whether the License Agreement is "determinable in nature" under Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, thereby barring the grant of an injunction

2. Whether the Respondent followed the mandatory contractual procedure for termination under Clauses 7.1 and 12.3 of the Agreement

3. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The court applied Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which prohibits specific performance of contracts that are "in their nature determinable"

It relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa, which clarified that contracts terminable only "for cause" with notice and cure periods are generally not "determinable" under Section 14(d)

The court also assessed the principles for interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which require a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury

The Court first rejected DMRC’s preliminary objection, holding that the contract was not "determinable" because termination was conditioned upon a breach (non-payment) and required a cure period, rather than being terminable "at will"

The Court noted the Petitioner’s repeated written admissions of liability and requests to adjust dues from the security deposit

The Court held that DMRC was not contractually obligated to exhaust the security deposit before terminating for default and found that the 2025 Cure and Termination notices remained valid as the defaults were never fully cured

The Court further ruled that Clause 13.6 (suspension of work during arbitration) does not freeze a valid termination but merely ensures payment of outstanding dues

Since the injury was purely commercial and quantifiable in damages, the triple test for an injunction was not met

The Court dismissed the petition, refused to stay the termination or restore utilities, and left all substantive disputes for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide