A Lok Adalat decree obtained by fraud for want of a party’s consent is a nullity.

Respondent Ravindra Kumar Shrivastava had brought a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction, in which the petitioner’s father was originally impleaded as a defendant.

The petitioner stated that he consented to a compromise decree only on the terms of a family settlement dated 13 June 1985; his statement to that effect was recorded on 8 February 2010

A further application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC was filed on 26 November 2010, but the petitioner was not a signatory. The Lok Adalat passed a compromise decree on that application on 11 December 2010

After learning of a sale deed said to have been executed on the basis of the decree, the petitioner filed a civil suit challenging it. The trial court rejected that suit under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, observing that the Lok Adalat decree could be challenged by a writ petition. The petitioner then brought this writ petition

Whether the Lok Adalat’s compromise decree could stand where the petitioner had not signed the later compromise application on which it was based

Whether the decree could be challenged as a nullity on the ground that it was obtained by fraud

Under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, a compromise decree must rest on a lawful compromise; the Court held on these facts that the petitioner’s signature was required on the subsequent compromise application

The Court applied the principle in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, and A.V. Papayya v. Government of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221, that a judgment or decree obtained by fraud is a nullity and may be challenged even in collateral proceedings

It also relied on Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706, distinguishing a decree that is void for want of jurisdiction from one that is merely erroneous or irregular

The petitioner’s recorded statement and the earlier compromise application showed consent only to a decree in accordance with the 1985 family settlement. The later application was filed after that statement, was not signed by the petitioner, and, in the Court’s view, did not reflect an intention to settle on the same terms

The Court concluded that the later application had been filed behind the petitioner’s back and that the Lok Adalat had erred in passing the decree on its basis. Treating the decree as obtained through fraud, the Court held that it could be set aside notwithstanding the petitioner’s delayed challenge

It restored the original suit to its number and directed the parties to appear before the trial court on 12 October 2026, after which the trial court was to proceed in accordance with law.