A Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) despite a police final report.

The petitioner-complainant lodged an FIR on 18 March 2015 alleging that Satendra alias Chunmun and Narain arrived on a red Pulsar motorcycle and fired at his brother, Anil Soni, with an intention to kill him, allegedly due to prior enmity.

The injured was medically examined the same day and a firearm injury was found. Statements of the injured and the complainant under Section 161 CrPC supported the allegations against the accused. Despite this material, the Investigating Officer submitted a final report. Following notice, the complainant filed a protest petition.

The Judicial Magistrate rejected the final report, took cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, and summoned both accused for trial under Section 307 IPC by order dated 10 January 2019.

Satendra challenged that order in revision. The Sessions Judge allowed the revision and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, holding that the Magistrate had not specifically recorded a finding that the case diary material disclosed an offence under Section 307 IPC.

The complainant then invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether a Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC and issue process despite a police final report concluding that no case is made out against the accused?

Whether, at the stage of taking cognizance and issuing summons, the Magistrate was required to undertake a detailed evaluation of the evidence or record a specific and elaborate finding regarding the commission of an offence under Section 307 IPC?

Whether the revisional court was justified in setting aside the Magistrate’s summoning order and remanding the matter for fresh consideration?

Under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, a Magistrate may independently apply his mind to the materials collected during investigation and take cognizance of an offence even when the police report recommends closure or states that no offence is made out; the Magistrate is not bound by the Investigating Officer’s conclusion.

In such a case, the Magistrate is not required to follow the procedure under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, although he may do so if appropriate.

The Magistrate must provide the informant an opportunity of being heard before accepting a final report and dropping proceedings, but no such impediment arises when cognizance is taken and process is issued.

At the summoning stage, the court must determine only whether a prima facie case or sufficient ground for proceeding exists; it must not assess the defence, weigh the evidentiary value of the materials, or determine whether conviction is likely.

These principles were drawn from H.S. Bains v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631; Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 7 SCC 768; Rakesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 133; Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 27; Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424; and State of Gujarat v. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta, (2019) 20 SCC 539.

Section 307 IPC was applicable where the surrounding allegations and firearm injury disclosed, prima facie, an attempt to commit murder.

The High Court found that the injury report established a firearm injury to Anil Soni, while the injured witness specifically attributed the shooting to Chunmun and identified Narain as accompanying him.

The injured also described the alleged motive, the firearm injury to his leg, and the circumstances in which the accused were recognised. The complainant’s statement corroborated this account.

This material, considered at the limited prima facie stage, was sufficient to disclose an offence under Section 307 IPC.

The Magistrate was entitled to disagree with the final report and take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC on the basis of the case diary materials.

He was not required to conduct a detailed assessment of credibility, consider the accused’s defence, or determine the sufficiency of evidence for conviction.

Accordingly, the revisional court erred in interfering merely because the Magistrate had not recorded a specific, elaborate finding in the manner expected by the revisional court.

The revisional order dated 15 July 2019 was set aside, and the Magistrate’s order dated 10 January 2019 summoning Satendra alias Chunmun and Narain was affirmed.

The petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was consequently allowed.