A Managing Committee cannot deny Rule 121 back wages by presuming unresolved qualification fraud.

The Petitioner joined New Saraswati Public Secondary School as an Assistant Teacher on 15 October 1993 and was subsequently assigned as Assistant Teacher (Computer) in 1996. His services were terminated on 16 October 2002 and 14 November 2002.

Although the Education Officer directed his recall and payment of dues, the School obtained ex post facto approval of the termination, which was later set aside by the Delhi High Court on 15 February 2017 for breach of Rules 118 and 120 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973; reinstatement was directed, while the question of back wages was left to be determined under Rule 121.

The School’s intra-court appeal and SLP were dismissed, but the Division Bench left open the question whether the Petitioner possessed the qualifications necessary to continue as an Assistant Teacher, subject to action in accordance with law and natural justice.

The Petitioner submitted a representation under Rule 121, but the Managing Committee rejected his claim for back wages on 5 August 2017, holding that he had used a fake certificate for the computer-teacher post and was responsible for his entire absence.

The Petitioner was eventually reinstated, and the School issued an order dated 19 April 2018 giving effect to reinstatement from 16 October 2002, but restricted monetary arrears to the period from 15 February 2017 onwards.

The subsequent disciplinary proceedings and removal from service in 2023 were expressly excluded from the present proceedings.

1. Whether the Managing Committee validly rejected the Petitioner’s claim for salary and allowances under Rule 121 by treating the allegation of use of a fake certificate as an established fact and attributing the entire period of absence to him.

2. Whether the Petitioner was entitled to full, partial, or no back wages for the period from 16 October 2002 to 14 February 2017, in light of the order of reinstatement, the unresolved qualification issue, and his assertion that he remained unemployed.

3. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable against the unaided private school in respect of an order passed under the statutory framework of Rule 121.

The Court applied Rule 121 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, which requires the Managing Committee, upon reinstatement, to pass a specified order regarding salary and allowances for the period of absence and whether that period is to be treated as duty.

Under Rule 121(2), full salary is payable where the employee has been fully exonerated, while any reduction for delay attributable to the employee requires notice, consideration of the employee’s representation, and written reasons.

Relying on Sunil Sikri v. Guru Harkrishan Public School, the Court held that Rule 121 confers a power coupled with a duty and requires a fair, reasoned determination by the Managing Committee; the employer cannot simply assume facts relevant to entitlement.

Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik establish that back wages are not automatic and may be full or partial, with gainful employment and other relevant circumstances being material considerations.

R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala permits consequences for an appointment procured by fraud only after the fraud or invalidity has been duly established.

Ruchika Rai Madan v. Directorate of Education confirms that the right to inquire into allegedly forged qualifications does not amount to a finding that the allegation is proved.

The Court also relied on St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava for the proposition that Article 226 may be invoked against a private body where the impugned action contains a public-law element.

The Court held that the Managing Committee exceeded the permissible scope of Rule 121 by treating the allegation that the Petitioner had used a fake certificate as conclusively established.

The Division Bench had merely left open a future inquiry into his eligibility as an Assistant Teacher; it had neither found him unqualified nor adjudicated that his original 1993 appointment was void.

The Managing Committee’s reasoning was also internally inconsistent: its order proceeded on the basis that, but for the computer-certificate issue, the Petitioner would have continued as an Assistant Teacher, whereas the School’s later defence asserted that his original appointment itself was non est.

Since the termination had ultimately been set aside, the Petitioner’s absence was involuntary; he reported for duty after reinstatement but was refused joining and was eventually reinstated only after contempt proceedings and further judicial intervention.

His sworn assertion of unemployment was not rebutted by any material from the School.

Nevertheless, full back wages were not warranted because the earlier judgments had not completely resolved all qualification-related issues and therefore did not amount to full exoneration under Rule 121(2).

Balancing these factors, the Court considered 50% back wages to be appropriate.

The Managing Committee’s order dated 5 August 2017 was set aside.

The Petitioner was awarded 50% of the back wages and admissible allowances for the period from 16 October 2002 to 14 February 2017, calculated on the basis of the pay admissible to him as an Assistant Teacher, with notional increments and applicable pay revisions for computation purposes.

Amounts already paid for any overlapping period were to be adjusted.

The School was directed to furnish the computation and make payment within eight weeks, failing which the unpaid amount would carry simple interest at 6% per annum from the expiry of that period until payment.

The separate claim for salary up to 15 October 2002 was left open, and the legality of the Petitioner’s subsequent removal from service was not examined.