A marriage promise made after alleged rape cannot establish rape induced by a false promise to marry.

The second respondent alleged that the appellant raped her on 5 May 2024, then expressed a desire to marry her to dissuade her from reporting the incident.

She said their relationship continued and that she became pregnant twice, with both pregnancies aborted.

She also alleged that the appellant and others assaulted and threatened her in October 2025.

The appellant claimed the relationship was consensual, that the respondent had extorted money from him, and that the FIR was a counterblast to complaints he had lodged on 7 November and 2 December 2025.

The High Court refused to quash the proceedings.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

1. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR and subsequent charge sheet under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

2. Whether proceedings relating to the appellant’s complaints, Annexures P1 and P2, should continue after the FIR against him was quashed.

The Court applied the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Relying on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947, and the principles in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, it reiterated a four-step approach to quashing: whether the accused’s material is sound and of sterling quality; whether it rules out the allegations; whether the prosecution or complainant has not refuted, or cannot justifiably refute, that material; and whether continuing the trial would be an abuse of process and would not serve the ends of justice.

If each step is satisfied, quashing is warranted.

The Court considered the appellant’s complaints and the material concerning payments alongside the parties’ admitted acquaintance and relationship.

It noted that the complainant did not allege that a promise of marriage induced her into sexual relations; rather, according to her account, the desire to marry was expressed after the alleged rape to prevent her from reporting it.

The Court also relied on the substantial delay in reporting the alleged rape, the absence of a police report concerning the alleged hotel assault and threats, and the lack of medical material supporting the claimed abortions.

Taken together, it concluded that the relationship was consensual and had later deteriorated into mutual accusations, and that a trial would serve no purpose.

It set aside the impugned order and quashed Charge Sheet No. 5 of 2026 in Criminal Case No. 147 of 2026, directing that no criminal proceedings continue against the appellant or any other accused in the FIR.

It also directed that further proceedings concerning Annexures P1 and P2 need not continue.

The appeal was allowed.