A maternal grandson through a married daughter is ineligible for land-oustee employment under the rehabilitation policy.

Bimal Kumar Pradhan was appointed by NTPC in 1991 as a nominee of his maternal grandfather, Haramohan Pradhan, whose land had been acquired for the Talcher Super Thermal Power Project.

After a challenge by a son of Haramohan, the High Court directed an inquiry into whether Bimal was a member of Haramohan’s family under the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960.

Following the inquiry, NTPC found that Bimal, as the son of a married daughter, was outside the applicable definition of “family”; disciplinary proceedings followed and he was dismissed from service on 11 November 2022.

The appellate authority affirmed the decision on 21 February 2023. Bimal challenged the Collector’s 2009 communication in W.P.(C) No. 189 of 2010 and the appellate order in W.P.(C) No. 18805 of 2022

1. Whether a maternal grandson, nominated by a land loser through his married daughter, qualified as a member of the land loser’s “family” for employment under NTPC’s Rehabilitation and Resettlement Plan

2. Whether the High Court should interfere under Articles 226 and 227 with the appellate order confirming dismissal, where the petitioner principally challenged that order without separately seeking to quash the inquiry report and disciplinary authority’s order

Paragraph 7(c) of NTPC’s Revised Rehabilitation Plan defined “family” as the affected person, their spouse, unmarried sons and unmarried daughters; the Court read that definition with the definition of “family” in Section 37(b) of the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960, and held that a married daughter—and consequently her son—was not included in the land loser’s family for this purpose

In State of Odisha v. K. Srinivasa Rao, (2001) 4 SCC 743, the Supreme Court held that a married daughter forms a separate family unit and is not part of her parents’ family under the Act.

Judicial review of disciplinary proceedings is supervisory, not appellate: under State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, and Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Court may intervene for procedural or natural-justice violations, perversity, or findings based on no evidence, but may not reappreciate evidence where some evidence supports the findings

A penalty may be reconsidered if it shocks the Court’s conscience, but ordinarily the matter is remitted to the disciplinary or appellate authority

The Rehabilitation Plan’s express definition of “family,” read with Section 37(b) and K. Srinivasa Rao, excluded a married daughter from her parental family; Bimal, her son, therefore did not qualify for employment merely because his maternal grandfather nominated him

The genuineness of the grandfather’s affidavit did not cure the ineligibility created by the Plan’s definition

The Court also found that Bimal had participated in the inquiry and had adequate opportunity to respond, and identified no procedural infirmity or other ground warranting judicial intervention.

Further, the disciplinary authority’s order and inquiry findings had not themselves been challenged, although the appellate order affirmed them.

Both writ petitions were dismissed, interim orders were vacated, pending interlocutory applications were disposed of, and no order as to costs was made