A mature woman’s continued consensual sexual relationship on a marriage promise does not constitute misconception of fact.

The prosecutrix and respondent No. 2 were university alumni, became friends through a common assignment, and later worked together on a start-up project.

She alleged that respondent No. 2 promised to marry her and, on that representation, forcibly established sexual relations with her at Hotel Royal-In, Gwalior, on 30.04.2022, and subsequently at Hotel Stay Bell, Indore, on 13.05.2022 and 15.05.2022.

She further alleged that respondent No. 2 later refused marriage, threatened her, and asked her to commit suicide.

An FIR was registered under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 Part II of the IPC, followed by investigation, filing of the charge-sheet, and trial.

The Trial Court acquitted respondent No. 2 on both charges on 14.02.2026. The prosecutrix challenged the acquittal under Section 413 of the BNSS.

Whether the prosecutrix’s consent to the sexual relationship was vitiated by a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC because it was allegedly obtained on a false promise of marriage?

Whether the evidence, including the prosecutrix’s testimony, the evidence of her father and other witnesses, and the forensic/DNA evidence, was sufficient to establish the offences under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 Part II of the IPC?

Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise liable to be interfered with in an appeal against acquittal?

The Court considered Section 90 of the IPC, under which consent given under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact is not legally valid, and Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 Part II of the IPC.

Relying on Manishwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2020 SC 4535, and Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46, the Court held that a promise to marry vitiates consent only where it was a fraudulent representation made without intention to fulfil it from the inception; a conscious and informed relationship maintained over time does not automatically constitute consent under misconception.

For appeals against acquittal, the Court applied Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 189, and K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979) 1 SCC 355, concerning appellate restraint where two views are reasonably possible.

It also relied on Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 76, for the principle that acquittal strengthens the accused’s presumption of innocence and may be reversed only for substantial and compelling reasons.

The Court found material inconsistencies between the FIR and the prosecutrix’s testimony. Although the FIR stated that she had initially rejected respondent No. 2’s marriage proposal, her evidence suggested that she had agreed to marry him and informed her family well before the alleged incidents.

The Court considered her conduct in staying overnight with respondent No. 2 at a hotel in Gwalior, her alleged failure to resist the subsequent sexual relations, and her continued friendly conduct inconsistent with the claim of forcible intercourse.

The father’s evidence regarding respondent No. 2’s alleged visits and evasive conduct was treated as an improvement over his police statement.

The Court also relied on the DNA evidence: the prosecutrix’s undergarment contained the same male DNA profile as respondent No. 2’s blood sample, and the Court considered the forensic result inconsistent with the asserted date of the last incident, inferring that the parties continued their physical relationship thereafter.

In light of these circumstances, the Court held that the relationship was consensual and that the consent was not based on a legally relevant misconception of fact.

It further held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and that there were no substantial or compelling grounds to disturb the acquittal.

The appeal was found meritless and was dismissed in limine at the admission stage. The judgment of acquittal dated 14.02.2026 was upheld, and the original record was directed to be returned to the Trial Court for information and compliance.