A mere agreement for sale confers no proprietary right warranting impleadment in a tenancy suit.

Dinesh Poddar, a tenant, filed Title Suit No. 224 of 2013 seeking a declaration of his tenancy rights over a shop room.

During that suit, he was dispossessed and filed Title Suit No. 105 of 2015 against his landlord, Suman Singh, and Achewar Nath Shukla, seeking recovery of possession and permanent injunction.

Shukla applied under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC to be added as a defendant in the 2013 suit, relying on an agreement for sale with the landlord.

The trial court allowed the application on the basis that Shukla’s presence was required to determine the real controversy and pass an effective decree.

Poddar challenged that order in revision, arguing that the agreement was unstamped and unregistered and gave Shukla no interest in the property.

Whether a person relying on an unstamped and unregistered agreement for sale, which conferred no right in the suit property, should be impleaded as a defendant in the tenant’s suit for declaration of tenancy.

Whether the trial court’s order allowing impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC should be set aside.

Order I Rule 10(2) CPC permits the court to add a party where its presence is required for the effective and complete adjudication of the questions in the suit.

Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899, as quoted by the Court, generally bars an instrument chargeable with duty from being admitted in evidence or acted upon unless duly stamped, subject to the provision’s stated exceptions.

Section 17(1-A) of the Registration Act, 1908, as quoted by the Court, requires registration of qualifying contracts to transfer immovable property for consideration if they are to have effect for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The Court further applied the principle that a mere agreement for sale does not, by itself, confer a right in the property.

The Court accepted that Shukla relied on an unstamped and unregistered agreement for sale and concluded that the agreement had no effect for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

It also held that a mere agreement for sale did not give Shukla a right in the suit property.

On that basis, it found that his impleadment was not warranted in Poddar’s suit for a declaration of tenancy, notwithstanding the trial court’s view that his presence was needed to uncover the real facts and enable an effective decree.

It allowed Poddar’s civil revisional application, CO 225 of 2026.