A mere online response does not establish election or cyber offences without their essential ingredients.

The petitioner invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking to quash criminal proceedings arising from Khunti P.S. Case No. 62 of 2019, including the order taking cognizance dated 7 June 2023 and the order framing charges dated 31 October 2025.

The allegation against him was that a SIM card registered in his name was used to respond to a post by a co-accused, which purportedly reproduced a letter attributed to a Lok Sabha candidate and referred to allocating 75% of the M.P. Fund to the Christian community.

The petitioner’s response questioned how the Hindu community would fare if that allocation were made.

Charges had been framed under Sections 171F and 171G of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000; no witness had yet been examined at trial.

Whether the allegations against the petitioner, taken at their highest, disclosed offences under Sections 171F or 171G of the Indian Penal Code.

Whether the allegations disclosed offences under Sections 66C or 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Whether continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of process warranting quashing.

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

For Section 171F IPC, the Court identified the relevant conduct as voluntary interference, or attempted interference, with the free exercise of electoral rights, or personation at an election.

For Section 171G IPC, it required, among other elements, publication by the accused of a false statement relating to a candidate’s personal character or conduct, with the requisite knowledge or belief as to falsity and an intent to affect the election result.

Section 66C of the Information Technology Act requires fraudulent or dishonest use of another person’s electronic signature, password, or other unique identification feature.

Section 66D requires cheating by personation through a communication device or computer resource; the Court described personation as pretending to be another, knowingly substituting one person for another, or representing a person to be someone they are not.

No precedent was relied upon in the judgment.

The Court assessed the allegations as pleaded, without determining whether the co-accused’s post was false.

The petitioner was alleged only to have responded to that post; there was no allegation that he interfered with voting or personated a voter, so Section 171F was not made out.

Nor was he alleged to have made or published the purported false statement about the candidate: his response questioned the proposed allocation, which the Court considered insufficient to satisfy Section 171G.

The allegations did not suggest that he used another person’s identifying feature, as required for Section 66C, or impersonated anyone, as required for Section 66D.

The Court therefore concluded that none of the charged offences was disclosed against him, even if the allegations were accepted in full.

It allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings, including the cognizance order dated 7 June 2023 and the charge-framing order dated 31 October 2025, qua the petitioner only.