A minor’s consent to sexual intercourse does not mitigate penetrative sexual assault under POCSO.

The victim, born on 21 February 2005 and aged approximately 17 years and 10 months at the time of the incident, met the appellant, aged 24, at a marriage ceremony in 2022. They developed a romantic relationship and the victim voluntarily stayed with the appellant in a rented house for several months.

They engaged in repeated sexual intercourse from December 2022, after which the victim became pregnant. Following a medical examination at the Primary Health Centre, Kadamtala, the victim’s statement was recorded and an FIR was registered under the POCSO Act on 22 May 2023. The appellant was charged under Sections 5(j)(ii) and 5(l), read with Section 6, of the POCSO Act. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses; the appellant did not cross-examine the victim, her mother, or several other material witnesses. The Special Court convicted the appellant on 15 April 2024 and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment on 16 April 2024. The appellant challenged the conviction and sentence in the present appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had committed repeated penetrative sexual assault upon the minor victim, notwithstanding the existence of a romantic relationship and the victim’s alleged consent.

Whether the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act was attracted and, if so, whether the appellant had rebutted it.

Whether inconsistencies concerning the FIR, the victim’s statements, the delay in registration, and the manner of recording the initial statement rendered the prosecution case unreliable.

Whether the “Romeo–Juliet clause” or the victim’s subsequent marriage justified interference with the conviction or sentence.

The Court applied Sections 5(j)(ii) and 5(l), read with Section 6, of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, concerning aggravated penetrative sexual assault and its punishment.

Under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, once the foundational facts of an offence under Section 5 are established, the Court presumes that the accused committed the offence unless the contrary is proved.

Section 30 permits a presumption regarding the requisite culpable mental state, subject to rebuttal by the accused.

The Court reiterated that a minor’s consent to sexual intercourse has no legal validity under the POCSO Act and cannot constitute a mitigating circumstance for the offence.

It also considered the “Romeo–Juliet clause” discussed by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29, and the approach adopted in Shri Roshan Lakra v. The State & Anr., CRA 4 of 2024, while noting that such considerations do not automatically exonerate an accused where the factual circumstances do not support their application.

The Court found that the victim’s evidence established her cohabitation and repeated sexual relationship with the appellant, and that her pregnancy was attributable to that relationship.

Her testimony was not challenged in cross-examination, nor was the evidence of her mother and several other prosecution witnesses; the Court therefore treated the material evidence as effectively uncontroverted.

The medical evidence corroborated the victim’s account of a continuing physical relationship with the appellant, and the appellant’s medical examination established his capacity to engage in sexual intercourse.

These facts established the foundational basis for applying Section 29. The appellant neither adduced evidence nor otherwise rebutted the statutory presumption that he was responsible for the offence.

The Court held that the existence of a love affair and the victim’s apparent consent could not legally defeat the charge because she was below eighteen years of age.

It further declined to apply the Romeo–Juliet principle because the victim had subsequently married another person and was living with her husband and child; pairing her with the appellant would not restore their relationship but could disrupt her existing family life.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the appellant’s conviction under Sections 5(j)(ii) and 5(l), read with Section 6, of the POCSO Act, and affirmed the sentence of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment imposed by the Special Court.

Pending applications were disposed of, and directions were issued for transmission of the trial records and communication of the judgment to the Trial Court and the Superintendent of the correctional home.