A minor’s credible testimony, corroborated by medical evidence, sustains POCSO conviction notwithstanding alleged consent.

The appellant was prosecuted for repeatedly taking PW1, a minor girl, away from her workplace on 10.11.2016, 10.02.2017 and 30.03.2017, allegedly on the pretext of marriage and by threatening suicide. He took her to Tiruppur and later to Gingee, tied a mangalsutra around her neck on one occasion, and allegedly had sexual intercourse with her during the periods of their stay together.

PW1’s mother lodged the complaint on 23.04.2017 after being unable to trace her daughter, leading to registration of the FIR and investigation.

The prosecution examined eleven witnesses and marked Exhibits P1 to P15.

The victim’s school records established her date of birth as 30.06.2002, making her a child under the POCSO Act on the dates of occurrence.

The Special Court convicted the appellant under Section 366 IPC and Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under each count, with concurrent sentences, while acquitting him under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act.

The appellant challenged the conviction, principally contending that PW1’s evidence was inconsistent with her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and medical history, that there was delay in lodging the complaint, and that the case arose from a consensual relationship.

1. Whether the prosecution proved that PW1 was below eighteen years of age on the dates of occurrence, thereby attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act.

2. Whether PW1’s testimony, despite omissions in her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and alleged inconsistencies regarding sexual intercourse, was sufficiently reliable to sustain the conviction.

3. Whether the delay in lodging the complaint and the non-examination of certain witnesses rendered the prosecution case doubtful.

4. Whether the appellant’s conduct established the offences under Section 366 IPC and Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and whether the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act operated against him.

The Court applied Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, under which a person below eighteen years is a child, and Section 5(l) read with Section 6, concerning aggravated penetrative sexual assault committed repeatedly.

It applied Section 366 IPC to the taking or enticing of a woman with the requisite intention relating to marriage or sexual intercourse.

The Court held that, once the victim’s minority is established, consent is legally immaterial in a POCSO prosecution.

It further applied Section 29 of the POCSO Act, under which a statutory presumption arises against the accused once the foundational facts of the charged offence are established.

Relying on Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, and the principles stated in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, State of U.P. v. Pappu, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra and Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, the Court held that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix may sustain a conviction if it is reliable, trustworthy and of sterling quality; corroboration is not a legal requirement.

The Court also applied the rule that delay in reporting a sexual offence is not automatically fatal and must be assessed in the context of the explanation and surrounding circumstances.

The Court found that the school admission and withdrawal records, transfer certificate and school certificate, supported by the Headmistress’s evidence, conclusively established PW1’s date of birth as 30.06.2002; she was therefore a child on the relevant dates.

PW1 consistently described the appellant’s conduct in taking her to Tiruppur and Gingee, inducing her through assurances of marriage, and having repeated sexual intercourse with her during those stays.

The Court held that the omission to narrate the sexual relationship in the Section 164 statement did not destroy her credibility because she had stated that she was unwilling to disclose anything further, having been led to believe that the appellant would marry her and take her home.

Her testimony was supported by the medical evidence showing sexual intercourse and by the appellant’s medical examination establishing his potency.

The delay in filing the complaint was considered natural because the appellant had taken the victim away on more than one occasion and PW2 lodged the complaint only after searching for her following the final disappearance.

The Court treated the discrepancies and non-examination of other witnesses as non-fatal, holding that they did not undermine PW1’s clear and cogent testimony.

Since the prosecution established the victim’s minority, repeated sexual acts and the appellant’s act of taking her away, consent was irrelevant and the presumption under Section 29 remained unrebutted.

It held that PW1 was a minor, that her testimony was reliable and adequately supported by the medical and documentary evidence, and that the prosecution proved the offences under Section 366 IPC and Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The conviction and concurrent sentences of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine imposed by the Special Court were confirmed.

The criminal appeal was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to secure the appellant and commit him to prison to undergo the remaining sentence.