A partition instrument that itself effects division of property is compulsorily registrable and inadmissible if unregistered.

The plaintiff claimed a half share in the suit properties, which she purchased from Jayaraman. The properties had originally been allotted to Gunasekaran and the first defendant under a partition deed dated 25 January 1974.

The defendants resisted partition, relying on an alleged subsequent partition dated 15 May 1996 (Ex.B.4), under which they said the properties had been divided between Gunasekaran and the first defendant.

The Subordinate Judge decreed partition of a half share in favour of the plaintiff; the Principal District Judge dismissed the defendants’ appeal and affirmed that decree. The defendants then filed this second appeal.

Whether the alleged partition deed dated 15 May 1996 (Ex.B.4) established a prior partition, despite being unregistered, such that the plaintiff was not entitled to a partition decree.

Whether the courts below erred in their treatment of the burden of proof concerning the alleged partition, including under Section 101 of the Evidence Act.

Whether the suit or the first appellate judgment was defective for non-joinder of Gunasekaran or for failure to frame an issue on maintainability, including under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.

Under Section 17 of the Registration Act, a document that itself effects a partition of immovable property must be registered; the court distinguished no earlier written division from a partition reduced to writing on the date it is made.

Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the party asserting the alleged partition bears the burden of proving it.

The court also considered Order XLI Rule 31 CPC in addressing the challenge to the first appellate judgment.

Ex.B.4 recorded a partition made on the date of the document, rather than memorialising an earlier oral partition, and was therefore required to be registered under Section 17; because it was unregistered, the courts below correctly rejected it as proof of partition.

The sale deed to Jayaraman referred to the 1974 partition but not the alleged 1996 partition, and the evidence did not otherwise establish that later partition; revenue-record mutations alone were insufficient.

The defendants, as the parties asserting the 1996 partition, bore the burden of proving it and failed to do so.

The court found no material maintainability objection requiring an additional issue, held that Gunasekaran was not a necessary party after the relevant sale, and rejected the Order XLI Rule 31 challenge.

It dismissed the second appeal, closed the connected miscellaneous petition, and made no order as to costs.