A party cannot relitigate disciplinary authority settled by an unchallenged Division Bench order.

S. Boopalan, an employee of the petitioner Society who had served as Assistant Secretary and in-charge Secretary, was dismissed in 2007 following disciplinary proceedings.

The dismissal was set aside by a Single Judge, and, on appeal, a Division Bench remitted the matter to the Joint Registrar to issue a fresh charge memo and conduct further proceedings.

The Joint Registrar issued a charge memo in March 2017; following an enquiry, Charges 1 and 3(A) were found proved, while Charges 2 and 3(B) were not proved.

On 22 June 2017, the Joint Registrar imposed reduction in rank for three years and denied back wages.

The Society challenged that order, arguing that the Joint Registrar lacked authority and that the penalty was too lenient.

Boopalan died in 2018, and his legal representatives opposed the petition.

1. Whether the Society could challenge the Joint Registrar’s authority to conduct the disciplinary proceedings when the Division Bench had directed that authority to do so and the Society had not challenged that direction.

2. Whether the Joint Registrar’s disciplinary order, including the three-year reduction in rank, warranted interference or enhancement in the Society’s writ petition.

Article 226 of the Constitution provides for judicial review of administrative action.

The Court treated the Division Bench’s unchallenged direction to the Joint Registrar to conduct the disciplinary proceedings as binding in the subsequent proceedings; a party that was bound by that order could not re-agitate the authority issue before a Single Judge.

The Court also applied the principle that a disciplinary order should not be interfered with where the prescribed procedure was followed and the disciplinary authority had properly considered the enquiry findings and the employee’s explanation.

Sections 75(3) and 77 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, and the relevant Government Orders were referred to in the earlier litigation, but the Court did not independently determine their effect in this petition.

The Court noted the possible remedy under Section 153 but proceeded to decide the petition.

The Society’s jurisdictional objection depended on its contention that the Division Bench had overlooked a later Government Order.

The Court held that the Society had been a party to the appeals and should have challenged the Division Bench’s direction by review or appeal; it could not reopen that question while challenging the order made in compliance with that direction.

On the merits, the Court noted that the enquiry had distinguished between proved and unproved charges, that the disciplinary authority had considered the charges and Boopalan’s explanation, and that no procedural defect was alleged.

It therefore found no basis either to set aside the three-year reduction in rank or to enhance the penalty.

The writ petition was dismissed.