A party may withdraw a challenge without defeating rights preserved by the underlying adjudication.

The Prescribed Authority allowed the landlords’ release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, and the tenants’ statutory appeal was dismissed.

The tenants then filed this petition challenging those orders; an interim stay was granted. They later sought to withdraw the petition, citing a family settlement and alleged surrender of possession on 7 April 2026.

The landlords opposed withdrawal, disputing the surrender and alleging unpaid rent since 1 September 2023; they also sought payment of arrears or continuing rent as a condition of withdrawal.

1. Whether the petitioners could withdraw their challenge to the release and appellate orders, notwithstanding the respondents’ claim that rights had accrued under those orders.

2. Whether withdrawal could be refused or made conditional on payment of disputed rent arrears, or on determination of the alleged surrender of possession.

Although Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not strictly govern proceedings under Articles 226 and 227, its principles are relevant to withdrawal of such proceedings.

Hulas Rai Baij Nath v. Firm K.B. Bass & Co., AIR 1968 SC 1114, recognises the ordinary right to withdraw a proceeding, while distinguishing unconditional withdrawal from withdrawal with liberty to bring a fresh proceeding.

K.S. Bhoopathy v. Kokila, (2000) 5 SCC 458, confirms that liberty to institute a fresh proceeding is distinct and discretionary.

Under R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman, (1999) 4 SCC 895, withdrawal cannot be permitted to defeat a right already accrued to the opposite party.

Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 56, applies the principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 to writ petitions: unconditional withdrawal ordinarily bars a fresh petition to re-agitate the same cause of action.

The petition challenged existing adjudications; withdrawing it would not set aside or nullify the Prescribed Authority’s release order or the appellate judgment, so the respondents’ rights flowing from those orders would remain undisturbed.

The respondents’ wish for a decision on the merits did not, by itself, justify compelling the petitioners to continue.

The disputed surrender, the authority of the alleged recipient, and the rent claim were not necessary to decide the withdrawal application and were left for determination in appropriate proceedings.

Accordingly, payment or deposit of disputed arrears was not made a condition of withdrawal, without extinguishing any claim or defence concerning rent or possession.

The challenged orders remained undisturbed, the interim order was vacated, and the disputed questions concerning possession, surrender, the family settlement and rent were left open for determination by the competent forum.

There was no order as to costs.