A pendente lite transferee cannot resist execution of a final specific-performance decree.

The plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 91 of 2012 seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 8 September 2005.

The suit was decreed ex parte on 17 August 2017, directing the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration of ₹60,00,000 and the defendants thereafter to execute the sale deed.

The defendants later filed I.A. No. 419 of 2019 seeking condonation of a 567-day delay in applying to set aside the ex parte decree.

During the pendency of the suit, the defendants had sold 1.5 acres of the suit property to the purchaser under a registered sale deed dated 22 January 2016.

After the decree-holder initiated E.P. No. 35 of 2019, the purchaser filed E.A. No. 2 of 2021 under Order XXI Rule 58, Section 47 and Section 151 CPC, seeking dismissal of the execution petition.

The Executing Court accepted the objection, treated the decree as incapable of execution, allowed E.A. No. 2 of 2021 and dismissed E.P. No. 35 of 2019.

Whether the defendants had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the 567-day delay in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree for specific performance?

Whether the Executing Court could rely on the judgment in S.A. No. 1463 of 1982 to hold that the decree for specific performance was non est or inexecutable?

Whether an alienee pendente lite could maintain an objection under Order XXI Rule 58 or Section 47 CPC to resist execution of a decree for specific performance?

Whether the purchaser, having acquired the property from the judgment-debtors during the pendency of the suit, was barred by the doctrine of lis pendens and Order XXI Rule 102 CPC from resisting execution?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon establishment of “sufficient cause.”

It applied Order XXI Rule 58 CPC, holding that the provision concerns adjudication of claims or objections to property under attachment and is inapplicable where no attachment exists.

Section 47 CPC permits the Executing Court to decide questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree between the parties or their representatives, but does not ordinarily permit re-examination of the merits or validity of a final decree.

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 embodies the doctrine of lis pendens, making a transferee pendente lite subject to the result of the pending litigation.

Order XXI Rules 97–102 CPC govern resistance to delivery of possession, with Rule 102 barring a transferee from the judgment-debtor who acquired the property after institution of the suit from resisting execution.

The Court relied on Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, Pradeep Mehra v. Harijivan J. Jethwa, Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin, K.N. Aswathnarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka, Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, B. Renushree v. G. Karthikeyan, K.S. Ravi v. K.P. Manickam and P. Deivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, among others, for the principles that an executing court cannot go behind a final decree, a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree, and a purchaser pendente lite cannot obstruct its execution.

The Court held that the defendants failed to establish sufficient cause for their prolonged default.

Their illness allegedly restricted the first defendant’s mobility for only about three months, but there was no explanation for their failure to follow up the suit from July or August 2017 until April 2019.

The defendants had been served, had filed a written statement, and were aware that the suit concerned valuable immovable property; their subsequent inaction was therefore not bona fide or diligent.

The Court also noted that the decree for specific performance had become final because the defendants neither successfully challenged the ex parte decree nor pursued a statutory first appeal, and the balance consideration had been deposited with the Court’s permission.

As to execution, the Court examined S.A. No. 1463 of 1982 and found that it merely concerned the refusal of an injunction to a co-owner.

It contained no finding invalidating or nullifying the sale agreement involved in the specific-performance suit.

The Executing Court therefore erred in relying on that judgment to declare the decree inexecutable.

The purchaser’s application under Order XXI Rule 58 was also misconceived because there was no attachment against which a claim or objection could be adjudicated.

Section 47 CPC did not assist the purchaser, who was not a purchaser in execution and could not claim the statutory status contemplated by that provision.

In any event, the purchaser had acquired the property after institution of the suit and was consequently bound by the decree under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and barred by Order XXI Rule 102 CPC from resisting or obstructing execution.

The purchaser’s alleged investment in development and third-party sales could not supersede the decree or defeat the decree-holder’s rights.

The Court held that the defendants had not shown sufficient cause for condoning the 567-day delay in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree.

CRP Nos. 1146 and 1147 of 2024, filed by the decree-holder, were allowed.

The orders allowing E.A. No. 2 of 2021 and dismissing E.P. No. 35 of 2019 were set aside, and the execution petition was restored to file.

The Executing Court was directed to proceed in accordance with Order XXI CPC and dispose of the execution petition within three months from receipt of the High Court’s order.

No costs were awarded, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.