A plaintiff seeking bare injunction must prove actual possession; title documents alone are insufficient.

The plaintiff claimed to have purchased the suit properties from the first defendant through the first defendant’s power agent, Thamaraiveni, under a registered sale deed dated 24 July 2002, and sought a permanent injunction against interference with his possession.

The defendants contended that the powers of attorney had been given as security for loans, that the sale was not genuine, and that the first defendant’s tenant remained in possession.

The trial court decreed the suit; the first appellate court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed under Section 100 CPC.

The High Court considered the parties’ competing accounts of possession and the substantial questions of law framed on admission.

Whether the plaintiff proved possession sufficient to obtain a permanent injunction in a suit for bare injunction?

Whether the registered powers of attorney could be treated as irrevocable by implication, and whether the plaintiff could rely on title and the principle that possession follows title despite the absence of a declaration claim?

Whether the first defendant’s cancellation of the registered powers of attorney by a letter sent under certificate of posting was valid?

Whether the judgment in a separate specific-performance suit should be received as additional evidence in the second appeal?

In a suit seeking only a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must establish actual possession and the alleged interference; documentary evidence of title or ownership-related entries does not, by itself, establish possession.

The court treated title as unnecessary to decide where the suit was for bare injunction, particularly where title was disputed and the plaintiff had not sought a declaration.

It also observed that intimation by letter alone was insufficient to cancel a registered power of attorney, answering that substantial question in the appellant’s favour.

The judgment cites no precedent and does not identify a statutory provision as the basis for these principles; Section 100 CPC appears in the appeal’s prayer.

The court found that the plaintiff’s own evidence referred to an arrangement under which he would receive agricultural produce from the land, and that he acknowledged the presence of Nagammal, whom the defendants identified as their cultivating tenant. Nagammal also testified that she was in possession.

The plaintiff did not specify when the defendants allegedly interfered, and the court held that the sale deed, patta and other documents did not overcome the evidence bearing on actual possession.

Because possession was not proved, the court found no basis to grant an injunction.

It declined to decide title in this bare-injunction suit; accordingly, the plaintiff could not rely on the principle that possession follows title to cure the failure to prove possession.

Although the letter was insufficient to cancel the registered powers of attorney, that finding did not establish the plaintiff’s possession or entitle him to the relief sought.

It held that the plaintiff had failed to prove possession and that the additional judgment from the specific-performance suit was not necessary to decide the injunction claim.

The second appeal and the application to receive additional evidence were dismissed; no costs were awarded.