A preliminary demand communication is not a final coercive order warranting writ interference.

The petitioner challenged a communication dated 2 February 2023 issued by the Branch In-charge of the Bihar State Financial Corporation, Ranchi, demanding alleged outstanding dues of ₹1,00,21,367.39 in relation to the mortgage assets of M/s Gangajali Cold Storage.

She contended that the entire consideration for purchase of the assets had been paid by her late husband and that the Corporation had executed a registered sale deed on 25 April 1984.

The communication required liquidation of the alleged dues within a fortnight and stated that, upon failure, the Corporation could initiate further proceedings, including issuance of legal notice and publication of an auction-sale notice under Sections 29 and 30 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.

The petitioner sought quashing of the demand and issuance of a no-dues certificate.

No subsequent legal notice or auction-sale notice was placed on record.

Whether the communication dated 2 February 2023 constituted a final, enforceable determination of the petitioner’s liability warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the communication, which merely informed the petitioner of alleged dues and proposed future action, violated any fundamental right or the principles of natural justice.

Whether the Court should adjudicate the correctness of the alleged outstanding amount at the stage of the impugned communication.

The Court applied the principles governing judicial review under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, namely, that interference is generally not warranted against a mere demand or preliminary communication that does not finally determine rights or impose a completed coercive measure.

Sections 29 and 30 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 were referred to as provisions under which the Corporation could take further recovery or enforcement steps in accordance with law, including issuance of an auction-sale notice.

The Court further held that mere communication of alleged dues and proposed future action, without a final determination or coercive action, does not by itself establish infringement of fundamental rights or violation of natural justice.

The Court examined the language of the impugned communication and found that it only informed the petitioner of the Corporation’s asserted dues, granted time for payment, and indicated that further lawful steps might follow in case of default.

Since no subsequent legal notice, auction-sale notice, or other coercive measure had been shown, the communication neither finally determined the petitioner’s rights nor placed her property at auction.

Accordingly, it was not a final order amenable to interference merely because the petitioner disputed the alleged liability.

The Court also found no violation of fundamental rights or natural justice, as the petitioner had been informed of both the alleged dues and the proposed course of action.

It therefore declined to examine the merits or correctness of the amount at that stage.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not adjudicated the correctness of the alleged outstanding amount and that the petitioner remained free to raise all legally available objections if the Corporation subsequently took further action.

Any pending interlocutory applications were disposed of accordingly.