A prior injunction decree does not establish title or adverse possession over government land.

The plaintiff claimed that her mother, Sebasthiammal, had occupied PWD land and that the plaintiff acquired the property under a 2009 settlement deed.

Sebasthiammal had obtained a permanent injunction against eviction without due process in an earlier suit, O.S. No. 542 of 1985.

The plaintiff later sued for declaration of title by adverse possession and permanent injunction.

The defendants disputed her relationship to Sebasthiammal, her possession, the settlement deed, and whether the property in the earlier suit was the same property.

The trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed. The plaintiff appealed under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the plaintiff established title by adverse possession and was entitled to a declaration and consequential permanent injunction

2. Whether the courts below were justified in dismissing the suit despite the earlier permanent-injunction decree in favour of Sebasthiammal, including as to the property covered by that decree

The court applied the principles governing adverse possession: a claimant must specifically plead and prove the commencement and duration of possession, and establish possession that is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario—without force, secrecy, or permission; the court also treated possession against the Government as requiring proof for the applicable 30-year period.

A prior decree protecting possession against eviction without due process does not, without more, establish title or adverse possession, and its effect is confined to the property it covers.

The judgment cites no specific precedent or statutory provision as the basis for these principles.

The plaintiff did not adequately plead when the alleged adverse possession began or produce evidence establishing continuous possession for the required period.

The earlier decree only protected Sebasthiammal from eviction without due process; it did not determine title or establish the plaintiff’s later possession.

The plaintiff also failed to prove that she was Sebasthiammal’s daughter or that the settlement deed was duly proved after its execution was disputed.

Further, the property descriptions differed: the earlier suit concerned 40 by 13 feet, while the present suit concerned 30 by 30 feet.

These evidentiary and identity deficiencies supported the concurrent findings against the plaintiff.

It found no illegality or perversity in the concurrent decisions and dismissed the second appeal; the connected miscellaneous petition was closed, with no order as to costs.