A rape conviction cannot rest on selectively accepted, materially contradictory testimony of the prosecutrix.

The prosecutrix, PW-1, alleged that on 19.06.2009 the appellant took her in his car to a flat in Ludhiana on the pretext of introducing her to his daughter, kept her there for two days, and thereafter took her to an abandoned factory at Malerkotla, where he allegedly had sexual intercourse with her against her will and threatened her. She was recovered with the appellant on 25.06.2009, following which an FIR was registered under Sections 363, 366-A and 376 IPC; the charge-sheet was ultimately filed under Sections 366 and 376 IPC.

The Sessions Court acquitted the appellant under Section 366 IPC, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age or that she had been taken away by force or deceit. However, it convicted him under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the reliability of the prosecutrix’s testimony, relied on alleged civil disputes and asserted that the intercourse was consensual; the State maintained that the prosecutrix was a minor and that Section 114A of the Evidence Act raised a presumption against consent.

1. Whether the conviction under Section 376 IPC could be sustained when the prosecution’s case regarding kidnapping or abduction under Section 366 IPC had been disbelieved and the prosecutrix’s testimony contained material contradictions?

2. Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse was without the prosecutrix’s consent, particularly in light of her conduct, the medical evidence and the alleged application of Section 114A of the Evidence Act?

3. Whether the prosecution had satisfactorily established the prosecutrix’s age so as to attract the statutory rule concerning sexual intercourse with a girl below the prescribed age under the pre-2013 Section 375 IPC?

The Court applied the pre-2013 versions of Sections 375 and 376 IPC, under which rape included sexual intercourse against a woman’s will or without her consent, as well as intercourse with a woman below 16 years of age, and Section 376 prescribed the applicable punishment.

It considered Sections 359–362 IPC: Section 361 defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship, while Section 362 defines abduction through force or deceitful means.

The Court reiterated that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix can sustain a rape conviction, but only where it inspires confidence and is reliable; the prosecution evidence cannot be selectively rejected for one charge and accepted for another when the charges arise from the same factual narrative.

It further held that the mere presence of spermatozoa or absence of injuries does not, by itself, establish rape, and that Section 114A of the Evidence Act could not replace an assessment of the credibility of the prosecutrix’s testimony in the circumstances of the case.

The Court found the prosecutrix’s evidence materially unreliable. Her account contained contradictions regarding the mode of return from Malerkotla—car in examination-in-chief and train in cross-examination—and she did not raise an alarm or attempt to escape while travelling through crowded and brightly lit places, including during the journey on the scooter and the train.

These circumstances supported the Sessions Court’s finding that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and undermined the allegation of force or deceit under Section 366 IPC.

The Court held that the same testimony, having been disbelieved in relation to kidnapping or abduction, could not selectively be accepted to prove forcible sexual intercourse under Section 376 IPC.

The medical evidence—absence of external or internal injuries and the presence of spermatozoa—did not independently establish non-consensual intercourse.

Further, the prosecution had not satisfactorily established the prosecutrix’s age below the relevant statutory threshold; the ossification test placed her age between 17 and 19 years, and the trial court treated her as a major.

Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove rape beyond reasonable doubt.

The judgments of the Sessions Court dated 01.06.2012 and the High Court dated 12.09.2013 were set aside, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 376 IPC, and the criminal appeal was allowed.