A rape FIR cannot be quashed where consent remains a matter for investigation and trial.

Respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint alleging that the petitioner had raped and exploited her, beginning in 2006, and that the abuse continued over time.

The complaint led to registration of Crime No. 122/2025 for offences under Sections 420, 376, 504 and 506 of the IPC.

The petitioner argued that the complaint was a counterblast to eviction proceedings concerning property he had leased to respondent No. 2; he also relied on a decree in his favour in the eviction suit.

Although the petitioner initially denied sexual intercourse, a DNA report showed that he was the father of respondent No. 2’s child.

He then contended that the relationship was consensual and sought quashing, also relying on the 19-year delay in making the complaint.

The petitioner had obtained anticipatory bail.

1. Whether the petitioner had established a basis for invoking the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS to quash the FIR.

2. Whether the allegations, the delay in lodging the complaint, and the petitioner’s claim of consensual intercourse justified quashing the FIR at this stage.

The Court considered its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in relation to the request to quash the FIR.

The FIR invoked Sections 420, 376, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The petitioner relied on Samadhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528, for the proposition that a consensual relationship should not be given a criminal colour merely because it later becomes acrimonious.

The Court’s operative reasoning was that, on the allegations and material before it, it could not conclude that no offence had been committed; whether the intercourse was consensual and whether the alleged conduct constituted an offence required investigation and trial.

The DNA report established paternity, but did not resolve whether the sexual relationship was consensual.

The Court noted that the petitioner changed his position from denying intercourse to asserting consent after the report was received.

Although the complaint’s contents were said to prima facie indicate consensual intercourse, the Court held that consent, the existence of any offence, and the truth of the allegations could not be determined conclusively on the quashing petition.

The petitioner’s reliance on Samadhan and the delay therefore did not warrant quashing at this stage; the allegations required investigation and, if necessary, trial.

It dismissed the criminal petition, leaving the allegations to be addressed through investigation and trial.