A rape prosecution cannot be quashed merely because the victim and accused have compromised.

The petitioner sought to quash FIR Crime No. 63/2023, registered at Police Station Rampur, District Morena, for offences under Sections 64(1) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and the consequential proceedings, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), on the basis of a compromise with the complainant

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner entered the complainant’s house, raped her, and threatened to kill her and her children

The parties filed a compromise application supported by affidavits; the Principal Registrar verified the parties, signatures, and voluntariness of the compromise

The State opposed quashing, while the complainant supported the petitioner’s request

Whether the High Court should quash the FIR and consequential proceedings for an alleged offence of rape under Section 528 BNSS because the petitioner and complainant have settled the matter

Whether the alleged offence’s gravity and the possibility of pressure or inducement prevent the Court from acting on the compromise

Section 528 BNSS preserves the High Court’s inherent power to quash proceedings to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process

In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court held that this power is distinct from statutory compounding and must be exercised with due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence; heinous offences such as rape, which are not private in nature and affect society, are not fittingly quashed on compromise

Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, and State of M.P. v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, reiterate that rape prosecutions should generally not be quashed on the basis of settlement; Madanlal, relying on Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318, further cautions that compromise in rape cases may be the product of pressure and cannot justify intervention

The Court treated the alleged rape as a grave offence against society, rather than a dispute that could be resolved solely by private settlement

It found that the material on record suggested that the petitioner had committed rape, so the possibility of conviction could not be regarded as remote or bleak

It also held that compulsion, inducement, or force in securing the compromise could not be ruled out

Applying the principles in Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, and Madanlal, the Court concluded that the compromise did not warrant exercise of its inherent jurisdiction

It dismissed the petition and disposed of any pending interlocutory applications