A reasonable acquittal stands absent perversity in the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.

The appellant, the complainant and prosecutrix, alleged that the accused—a distant elder brother-in-law—had sexually assaulted her on 1 and 3 July 2017 and attempted to do so again on 6 July 2017, when her husband allegedly caught him and obtained a written apology.

She further alleged that the accused sought sexual favours in November 2019.

A complaint made to police in November 2019 did not disclose the alleged earlier rapes; a later complaint dated 18 December 2019 led to the FIR and prosecution under Sections 376(1), 354(A)(iii) and 506(ii) of the IPC.

The accused was acquitted by the Sessions Court, which found that the rape allegation had been fabricated amid a financial dispute concerning money lent by the accused to the complainant’s husband.

The complainant appealed against the acquittal.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference.

Whether the complainant’s and her husband’s evidence established the alleged sexual offences beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the delay, omission in the earlier police complaint and admitted financial dispute.

Under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), an appeal may be brought against an acquittal.

An appellate court should bear in mind the accused’s strengthened presumption of innocence following acquittal and should not interfere merely because another view is possible; interference is justified in exceptional cases, including where the acquittal is perverse.

A prosecutrix’s uncorroborated testimony may sustain a conviction if reliable and trustworthy. Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi, (2012) 8 SCC 21) describes a “sterling witness” as one whose account is consistent and withstands scrutiny.

Krishna Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130, reiterates that the prosecutrix’s sole testimony must inspire confidence and be trustworthy; material inconsistencies may make independent corroboration necessary.

Delay in lodging an FIR is not by itself a ground to disbelieve the prosecution, but the court must consider whether a satisfactory explanation has been given.

The High Court considered the complainant’s account alongside her husband’s evidence and the surrounding circumstances.

It found that the alleged rapes in July 2017 had not been disclosed in the earlier police complaint, while the FIR was lodged about two years after the alleged incidents; the complainant and her husband had not satisfactorily explained the omission or delay.

The court also considered the admitted financial dispute and the settlement under which the husband agreed to pay Rs. 12.5 lakh to the accused.

In that context, it held that the complainant’s and her husband’s testimony did not inspire confidence and that the possibility of a false allegation connected to the financial liability could not be ruled out.

The trial court’s assessment was supported by the evidence and was a reasonable view, not a perverse one warranting appellate intervention.

Finding no basis to interfere with the acquittal, the Court dismissed the appeal at the admission stage.