A relevant amendment raising subsequent alternative accommodation cannot be rejected solely for delay.

The petitioner-defendant challenged, under Article 227 of the Constitution, the order dated 03.07.2026 by which the First Civil Judge, Junior Division, Morena rejected his application under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking amendment of the written statement in a pending eviction suit under Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

The proposed amendment concerned the alleged availability of alternative accommodation with the plaintiffs: premises earlier let to the Central Bank of India for an ATM had been vacated and subsequently let to the State Bank of India. This fact emerged during the plaintiff’s cross-examination on 14.05.2024.

The trial court rejected the application as belated and barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The respondents contended that the written statement already contained pleadings regarding alternative accommodation and relied on the delay of nearly two years in filing the amendment application.

Whether the trial court was justified in rejecting the application for amendment of the written statement solely on the ground of delay and non-compliance with the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC?

Whether the proposed amendment concerning alternative accommodation was relevant and necessary for the effective adjudication of the eviction dispute, and whether it caused prejudice or altered the nature of the defence?

The Court applied Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, which empower the court to permit amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, subject to the proviso requiring due diligence where trial has commenced.

Relying principally on Life Insurance Corporation of India v. M/s Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1128, the Court held that amendments necessary for effective adjudication should ordinarily be allowed; delay alone is not a sufficient ground for rejection; and an amendment may be refused where it introduces a time-barred claim, changes the nature of the suit or defence, is mala fide, or causes prejudice by taking away a valid defence.

The Court also considered Nirmala Singh v. Mahendra Pratap Sharma & Others, 2015 (3) MPLJ 93, but found it inapplicable on the facts.

The Court accepted that the written statement already contained a general plea regarding alternative accommodation, but found that the proposed amendment introduced a specific and subsequent factual development—vacation of the ATM premises and its re-letting to another bank—which was directly relevant to the plaintiffs’ alleged bona fide need.

Applying the principles in LIC v. Sanjeev Builders, the Court held that the amendment would assist in determining the real controversy, did not introduce a new or inconsistent defence, did not change the nature of the proceedings, and was not shown to cause prejudice to the plaintiffs.

Although the application was delayed, the delay could be compensated by costs and, by itself, was insufficient to defeat a relevant amendment. The Court further observed that the factual basis for the amendment arose after commencement of trial, distinguishing the precedent relied upon by the respondents.

The respondents were permitted to seek consequential amendment. The trial court was directed not to reopen the entire evidence and to allow only restricted additional evidence, if necessary, confined to the amended pleadings.

Payment of costs was made a condition precedent. Given that the suit had been pending since 2015, the trial court was directed to endeavour to dispose of it preferably within eight months and to avoid unnecessary adjournments.