A second writ petition for previously claimed back wages is not maintainable without liberty to re-agitate the claim.

The petitioner was appointed on compassionate grounds under the 1993 policy. Pursuant to departmental guidelines, she underwent age verification before a Medical Board on 29 September 2009, which assessed her age as between 45 and 50 years in 2009.

After the 2013 Rules came into force, the respondents directed her to retire on attaining 62 years by order dated 29 March 2016.

The petitioner challenged that order in W.P. No. 2778 of 2016, seeking continuation in service and payment of benefits from the date of discontinuation.

On 21 February 2018, the High Court directed the respondents to pass an appropriate order on the basis of the Medical Board examination dated 29 September 2009.

In compliance, the respondents reinstated the petitioner by order dated 16 April 2018.

The petitioner thereafter filed the present petition seeking salary and consequential benefits for the period from 31 March 2016 to 16 April 2018, asserting that she had remained ready and willing to work but had been wrongfully kept out of service.

Whether the petitioner could maintain a subsequent writ petition seeking back wages for a period already covered by the relief claimed in her earlier writ petition, when the earlier order neither granted such relief nor reserved liberty to pursue it separately.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to salary and consequential benefits for the period from 31 March 2016 to 16 April 2018 after her reinstatement pursuant to the earlier High Court order.

The Court applied the principle that a subsequent writ petition on the same subject matter or cause of action is generally not maintainable where the earlier writ proceedings did not grant liberty to institute fresh proceedings or reserve the omitted relief.

Relying on Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1987 SC 88, the Court held that the principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be extended to writ proceedings in the interests of public policy and finality of litigation.

The Court also relied on Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, (1997) 2 SCC 534, concerning constructive res judicata in subsequent writ proceedings, and on the principles against multiplicity of proceedings reflected in Order II Rule 2 CPC.

The rule stated in State of U.P. v. Labh Chand, as quoted from the Full Bench decision in Surya Deo Mishra v. State of U.P., was that a second writ petition on the same matter should not be entertained even where the earlier petition was dismissed or disposed of on a preliminary ground, absent appropriate liberty.

The Court found that the petitioner’s earlier writ petition expressly sought continuation in employment and payment of all benefits from the date of discontinuation.

Although that petition was disposed of with a direction to reconsider the petitioner’s service status on the basis of the 2009 Medical Board examination, the order did not grant back wages, direct payment of intervening salary, or reserve liberty to raise that claim in fresh proceedings.

Since the present claim for back wages arose from the same discontinuation and had already formed part of the relief sought earlier, the Court treated the subsequent petition as an impermissible attempt to pursue an omitted relief through fresh writ proceedings.

The Court consequently accepted the respondents’ preliminary objection and held that the decision relied upon by the petitioner, Raghuwanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, was distinguishable and did not apply to the present facts.

The claim for salary and consequential benefits for the period from 31 March 2016 to 16 April 2018 was therefore not entertained.

The writ petition was dismissed, with no direction for payment of back wages or exemplary costs.