A Section 151 Electricity Act complaint without requisite authorization is legally unsustainable.

On 7 January 2006, officers of the electricity authority inspected premises at Santkutir, Nageswar, Jamnagar, where the residential electricity meter standing in the name of Bhagirathiben Kalyansinh Bhandari was allegedly not recording consumption.

The prosecution alleged that a plastic factory operated behind the residence by the respondent, her son, was drawing electricity directly from the residential connection through a cable and other apparatus, resulting in alleged theft of 5.285 kW of electricity valued at Rs. 2,70,017.82 under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

A written complaint was forwarded to the GEB Police Station, and the FIR was registered on 28 February 2006 as II-C.R. No. 137 of 2006, nearly two months after the inspection.

The respondent was charged under Section 135 of the Act; after the prosecution examined five witnesses and produced eight documents, and the respondent denied the allegations in his Section 313 CrPC statement, the Special Court, Jamnagar acquitted him on 12 September 2012 in Special (GEB) Case No. 59 of 2009.

The State challenged the acquittal under Section 378(1)(3) CrPC.

1. Whether the trial Court was justified in acquitting the respondent of the offence under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003

2. Whether the trial Court properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution

3. Whether the impugned judgment suffered from illegality, irregularity, perversity, or any other infirmity warranting appellate interference

The Court applied Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which criminalises dishonest abstraction, consumption, or use of electricity, including through unauthorised connections or tampering with meters.

It also considered Section 151 of the Electricity Act, under which cognizance of offences under the Act requires a complaint by an authorised person or an authorised governmental/electricity authority; a complaint unsupported by the requisite authorisation is not legally sustainable.

The Court further applied the principles governing appeals against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC: an appellate court may review and reappreciate the evidence, but an acquitted accused enjoys a reinforced or “double presumption” of innocence, and where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed.

These principles were drawn principally from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

The High Court found that the prosecution evidence did not establish the respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution witnesses admitted that the FIR was registered after an unexplained delay of almost two months, no panchnama was prepared at the inspection site, and neither the alleged electric cable nor other apparatus was recovered or produced before the Investigating Officer or trial Court.

The evidence also failed to establish the respondent’s ownership or occupation of the premises where the alleged factory was operating.

Additionally, the complainant had not obtained or demonstrated the authorisation required under Section 151 of the Electricity Act, rendering the prosecution legally unsustainable according to the authorities relied upon by the Court.

In light of these evidentiary deficiencies and the reinforced presumption arising from the acquittal, the trial Court’s view was held to be reasonable and neither perverse nor manifestly illegal.

Finding no illegality, perversity, or infirmity warranting interference with the acquittal, it dismissed the State’s appeal and confirmed the judgment and order dated 12 September 2012 acquitting the respondent under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial Court.