A short, medically supported delay warrants condonation where rejection forecloses merits adjudication.

The revisionist was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced to six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,95,000

Her appeal was dismissed after the appellate court rejected her application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a 25-day delay

She attributed the delay to her minor son’s illness and her own ill-health, and stated that she had filed supporting medical documents

Whether the appellate court should have condoned the 25-day delay in filing the criminal appeal, having regard to the explanation and supporting medical documents

Whether dismissal of the appeal following rejection of the delay-condonation application should be set aside and the appeal restored for decision on its merits

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits a delayed proceeding to be admitted where sufficient cause is shown.

The expression “sufficient cause” is to be construed liberally, pragmatically, and in a manner that advances substantial justice, particularly where the delay is short and bona fide; however, the discretion must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily

The revision arose from a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

No judicial precedent is identified in the judgment.

The Court considered the delay of 25 days to be short and noted that the revisionist had attributed it to her son’s illness and her own ill-health, supported by medical documents

Applying the liberal, justice-oriented approach to “sufficient cause,” the Court held that the delay ought to have been condoned. Because rejection of the application had prevented adjudication of the statutory appeal on its merits, the appellate court’s order could not stand

It expressed no opinion on the merits of the conviction or sentence; the criminal revision was partly allowed