A Special Judge’s prima facie finding cannot bind the authority deciding prosecution sanction.

The applicant, a retired Executive Engineer, was accused of demanding a ₹6.5 lakh bribe from a government contractor and receiving ₹1.5 lakh, with ₹5 lakh allegedly remaining.

The contractor later complained to the Lokayukta; audio recordings were made, and a forensic voice analysis reportedly matched the applicant’s voice.

Attempts to conduct a physical trap were unsuccessful.

The investigating officer filed a closure report in 2019, reasoning that the demand was not established, including because the trap had failed.

The Special Judge rejected the report and directed that the investigation records be placed before the competent authority for consideration of prosecution sanction within three months, while recording that a prima facie offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was made out.

The applicant challenged that order under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking acceptance of the closure report and arguing that the Special Judge’s finding could improperly influence the sanctioning authority.

Whether the Special Judge was entitled to reject the closure report on the material in the investigation record and direct that the records be placed before the competent authority for consideration of prosecution sanction.

Whether the Special Judge’s statement that a prima facie offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was made out should be treated as binding on, or capable of influencing, the sanctioning authority.

Under the principles stated in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359, a court receiving a police report may accept a closure report, disagree with the investigating officer’s conclusion and proceed on the material in the record, or direct further investigation; it is not bound by the police’s opinion.

Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of M.P., (2014) 13 SCC 707, distinguishes the operative decision rejecting a closure report from incidental observations that are not essential to that decision; such observations may constitute obiter and are not binding directions.

Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act requires the competent sanctioning authority to assess the material and apply its independent mind when deciding whether to grant sanction.

The Court also relied on Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Dr. Manmohan Singh, AIR 2012 SC 1185, in upholding the three-month period for the sanction decision.

The High Court held that the Special Judge could reject the closure report because the case record included digital recordings and a forensic voice-analysis report, and the investigating officer’s reliance on the failed trap did not prevent the court from independently assessing the material.

However, the Special Judge’s categorical statement that a Section 7 offence was prima facie made out risked appearing to predetermine the sanction decision.

Applying Arun Kumar Aggarwal, the High Court treated that statement as obiter, while preserving the decision to reject the closure report and refer the records to the competent authority.

The Special Judge’s order was upheld insofar as it rejected the closure report and directed placement of the records before the competent authority.

The statement that a prima facie offence under Section 7 was made out was directed to be treated as obiter dictum.

The sanctioning authority was directed to decide independently, on the investigation report and material on record, whether to grant or refuse sanction, without being influenced by the Special Judge’s observations.

The three-month period was left undisturbed.