A stigmatic termination is invalid without a regular departmental inquiry and hearing.

The petitioner had worked on a contractual basis in the respondent department since 1995, with his contract renewed from time to time.

Following a complaint that he had taken money from beneficiaries for Geo Tagging, a preliminary inquiry was conducted.

Seven days’ salary was deducted and a show-cause notice issued; the petitioner denied the allegations in his reply.

Respondent No. 4 subsequently terminated his contractual services by order dated 29 October 2025, relying on findings that he had taken money and had been negligent in his duties.

The petitioner challenged the termination under Article 226, alleging breach of natural justice and absence of a proper inquiry; the State opposed the petition and raised the availability of an appellate remedy.

1. Whether the petitioner’s termination, based on findings of misconduct and carrying stigma, could be sustained without a regular inquiry and a fair opportunity of hearing

2. Whether the State’s preliminary inquiry and show-cause process satisfied the procedural requirements for terminating the petitioner’s contractual services

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Court to review administrative action that is unlawful or procedurally unfair.

The Court relied on the principles of natural justice, including the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to answer allegations.

It referred to the State’s instruction dated 11 March 2022, which required a personal hearing, a proper inquiry, and a reasoned (“speaking”) order before contractual services were terminated on grounds of misconduct.

It further applied the rule that a termination order founded on misconduct and casting stigma, with adverse consequences for an employee’s future prospects, requires an inquiry consistent with natural justice; a preliminary inquiry or show-cause notice alone does not suffice where no regular inquiry is conducted with the employee’s participation.

The Court relied, among other authorities, on Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal, 2001 (3) MPLJ 616; Jitendra v. State of M.P., 2008 (4) MPLJ 670; and Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, on the content of a reasonable opportunity.

The termination order did not merely bring the contract to an end: it recorded that the allegation of taking money had been established and referred to the petitioner’s negligence and disregard of instructions, thereby casting stigma.

Although the petitioner had received a show-cause notice and submitted a reply, the Court found that no regular departmental inquiry had been conducted and that the prescribed procedure—including a personal hearing under the State’s instruction—had not been followed.

Applying the rule for stigmatic termination, the Court held that the preliminary inquiry and reply process did not cure the absence of a regular inquiry and adequate hearing.

The termination was therefore procedurally unsustainable.

It directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner within three months of receiving a certified copy of the order and to grant consequential benefits, but not back wages, applying the principle of “No Work No Pay.”

The respondents were left at liberty to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with law.