A subsequent failure to marry does not vitiate consent absent a false promise from inception.

The petitioner, the sole accused in Crime No. 219/2026 of Vazhakkulam Police Station, was alleged to have had sexual intercourse with the de facto complainant at various places after promising to marry her.

The alleged incidents occurred in February 2026, when the complainant was still married and her marriage had not yet been dissolved.

The parties subsequently became engaged on 11 March 2026 and allegedly lived together as husband and wife.

After learning that the complainant was pregnant, the accused allegedly asked her to abort the child and thereby cheated her.

On the basis of the complainant’s statement dated 7 May 2026, the police registered offences under Sections 69 and 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”).

The accused invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) seeking quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings.

Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 69 of the BNS based on sexual intercourse allegedly induced by a false promise of marriage.

Whether the allegation that the accused asked the complainant to abort her pregnancy and thereby cheated her discloses an offence under Section 316(2) of the BNS.

Whether the case warranted exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR and further proceedings.

Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, permits the High Court to quash criminal proceedings where, even accepting the allegations in their entirety, no offence is disclosed; however, the power must be exercised sparingly and without conducting a mini-trial.

For Section 69 of the BNS to apply, the prosecution must disclose that the promise of marriage was false from its inception and had a direct nexus with the woman’s consent to the sexual act; a mere subsequent failure to marry is insufficient.

Relying on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 (7) KHC 460, the Court reiterated that a prolonged or continuing physical relationship does not, without more, establish that consent was solely induced by a promise of marriage.

The use of the word “cheated” is likewise insufficient to constitute an offence under Section 316(2) of the BNS unless the factual allegations satisfy the statutory ingredients of cheating.

The Court found that the complainant’s own statement disclosed repeated sexual intercourse at different locations, indicating a continuing relationship between consenting adults rather than a single act induced solely by a false promise of marriage.

At the time the relationship commenced, the complainant was still legally married, and the FIR did not specifically allege that the accused knew of any pending divorce proceedings or had promised to marry her after dissolution of her existing marriage.

The subsequent divorce, engagement, cohabitation, and alleged failure to proceed with the relationship could not retrospectively establish that the promise was false at its inception or that it directly caused the complainant’s consent to the sexual relationship.

The allegation that the accused asked her to abort the pregnancy, together with the general assertion that he cheated her, did not set out the necessary ingredients of Section 316(2) of the BNS.

Since the FIR itself lacked the foundational facts necessary for either offence, continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of process.

Exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, the Court quashed the FIR in Crime No. 219/2026 of Vazhakkulam Police Station and all further proceedings arising from it.

The Criminal Miscellaneous Case was accordingly allowed.