A subsequently issued experience certificate remains valid where the underlying work preceded the tender.

The petitioner participated in a tender issued by the Uttarakhand Rural Roads Development Agency. Its technical bid was found responsive, but it was ranked third-lowest (L3) after the financial bids were opened, whereas respondent no. 6 was declared the lowest bidder (L1).

The petitioner challenged the Technical Evaluation Committee’s resolution dated 29.08.2026, which treated respondent no. 6’s technical bid as qualified, and sought consideration of its representation dated 25.07.2026.

The principal objection was that respondent no. 6 relied on an experience certificate dated 07.02.2026, issued after the NIT dated 28.01.2026.

The certificate recorded that respondent no. 6 had worked as a sub-contractor on a road rehabilitation and upgradation project commencing on 19.03.2025 and that the work had been satisfactorily completed.

The respondent authorities stated that the sub-contract work had actually been completed on 21.01.2026, before issuance of the NIT, and that only the certificate had been issued subsequently.

The petitioner also alleged that respondent no. 6 had inconsistently described the same work as both ongoing and completed in its bid documents.

Whether an experience certificate issued after the date of the NIT could be relied upon to establish the successful bidder’s eligibility when the underlying work had allegedly been completed before issuance of the NIT.

Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should interfere with the Technical Evaluation Committee’s decision to qualify respondent no. 6’s technical bid on the grounds raised by the unsuccessful bidder.

Whether the alleged inconsistency in respondent no. 6’s description of the work as ongoing and completed warranted rejection of its bid.

The governing constitutional framework was the High Court’s limited power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court applied the principle that judicial review of tender and contractual matters is limited and that courts should not lightly interfere with the decision of the authority responsible for evaluating bids.

Relying on M/s N.G. Projects Limited v. M/s Vinod Kumar Jain & Others, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 302, the Court reiterated that infrastructure projects should not ordinarily be stayed and that satisfaction regarding compliance with tender conditions primarily lies with the tendering authority.

It further recognized that, where the Technical Evaluation Committee’s decision is bona fide and is not alleged to be actuated by mala fides or extraneous considerations, a court should not substitute its own view merely because the decision is unfavorable to an unsuccessful bidder.

The Court treated the material fact as the date of completion of the underlying work rather than merely the date on which the experience certificate was issued.

Although the certificate was dated 07.02.2026, after the NIT dated 28.01.2026, the respondent authority stated that the work had been completed on 21.01.2026, before the NIT. Therefore, the later issuance of the certificate did not, by itself, deprive respondent no. 6 of the benefit of the completed work.

The petitioner’s contention regarding the inconsistent description of the work did not establish mala fides, extraneous consideration, or a clear jurisdictional error in the tender evaluation.

Applying the restraint required in tender matters and the principle that the procuring authority is primarily responsible for determining compliance with tender conditions, the Court declined to reassess the Technical Evaluation Committee’s decision.

It held that the subsequent date of issuance of the experience certificate, without more, was insufficient to invalidate respondent no. 6’s eligibility where the underlying work had been completed before issuance of the NIT.

Finding no ground for interference with the tender evaluation process, the Court dismissed the writ petition and granted no relief to the petitioner.