A Substantive Policy Modification via Corrigendum Without Executive Sanction is Legally Inoperative and Violates Article 166.

The petitioners were selected for the Special BTC Training Course, 2004. Under a Government Order (G.O.) dated 14.01.2004, it was stipulated that selected candidates would receive a stipend of Rs. 2,500/- per month from the start of training until the "date of their appointment"

While earlier litigation affirmed this entitlement up to the Supreme Court, the State issued a "corrigendum" dated 14.05.2015, which retroactively modified the condition to limit the stipend only to the "duration of the training period"

Consequently, the petitioners' claims for the remaining stipend were rejected by the respondent authorities in 2015 and 2016. The petitioners challenged these rejection orders and the corrigendum as being an unauthorized and substantive modification of a G.O. issued in the name of the Governor.

1. Whether a corrigendum issued at the departmental/secretarial level can legally alter a substantive policy and financial entitlement established by a Government Order sanctioned by the Governor under Article 166 of the Constitution

2. Whether the corrigendum dated 14.05.2015 constitutes a mere ministerial clarification of an inadvertent error or a substantive modification of a policy decision

Article 166 of the Constitution of India, which mandates that executive actions be taken in the name of the Governor and authenticated via Rules of Business.

The Court relied on Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar, establishing that executive action requires formal constitutional authentication to be enforceable.

Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, holding that public orders cannot be varied by subsequent administrative explanations.

Principles from Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, which distinguishes between the permissible correction of "accidental slips" and the impermissible alteration of the "substance" of a determination, and the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" from State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd.

The court reasoned that the original G.O. (14.01.2004) created a substantive financial right that petitioners relied upon when completing their training.

The Court found that by truncating the stipend period (shifting the end date from "appointment" to "completion of training"), the State effectively re-wrote the policy and extinguished accrued benefits.

The Court noted that because the original G.O. was issued with the Governor's sanction, any substantive modification required a new G.O. issued under the same constitutional discipline of Article 166, not a mere departmental corrigendum. Furthermore, since the Supreme Court had already affirmed the original stipend terms in previous rounds of litigation involving the same G.O., the State could not use a corrigendum to circumvent judicial finality.

The Court quashed the corrigendum (to the extent of the restriction) and the consequential rejection orders dated 18.05.2016, 09.06.2015, and 30.07.2015. The respondents were directed to pay the petitioners the stipend from the start of training until the date of appointment in accordance with the original 2004 G.O.s within four months.