A successive writ cannot reopen finally adjudicated eligibility criteria or challenge an appointment made under them.

The petitioner, an OUAT employee holding an M.Com. degree, was initially engaged as a Research Fellow under an ICAR project. After the project ended, he litigated for appointment to a suitable post.

In O.J.C. No.9987 of 1998, the High Court directed OUAT to consider him for a suitable post upon availability of a vacancy, with age relaxation.

Pursuant thereto, he accepted appointment as Junior Assistant in 2000 and was subsequently promoted as Senior Assistant and Section Officer.

In 2010, OUAT created a single post of Placement Officer, Class-II, and prescribed qualifications including a Bachelor’s degree with a Master’s degree in Business Administration, Human Resource Development, Personnel Management, or Public Relations and Advertisement.

The petitioner challenged the advertisement and sought consideration for the post in W.P.(C) No.19653 of 2010. That petition was dismissed on the ground that he lacked the qualification prescribed in the advertisement and that a subsequent change in qualification could not govern the ongoing selection process.

The writ appeal and SLP were dismissed; the review petition only resulted in deletion of one paragraph of the appellate order, leaving the dismissal of the original challenge undisturbed.

After completion of the selection process, opposite party No.5 was appointed as Placement Officer on 26 December 2015.

The petitioner thereafter submitted representations seeking appointment to the post, relying on a 2014 Agriculture Department letter proposing revised qualifications and indicating a different pay scale.

The Vice-Chancellor rejected the representations on 15 December 2020, stating that the post had already been filled through a completed selection process and that the petitioner’s claim lacked merit.

The petitioner challenged both the appointment order and the rejection order in the present writ petition. He subsequently retired from service.

Whether the petitioner could re-agitate the validity of the qualification prescribed in the 2010 advertisement and challenge the appointment of opposite party No.5 after the earlier litigation on the same subject had attained finality?

Whether the 2014 Agriculture Department communication prescribing or suggesting revised qualifications and pay could be applied retrospectively to the recruitment process initiated by the 2010 advertisement?

Whether the petitioner was entitled, under the order in O.J.C. No.9987 of 1998, to appointment or retrospective accommodation as Placement Officer, despite having accepted appointment and subsequent promotions in the ministerial cadre?

Whether the petitioner could be granted retrospective appointment or promotional benefits to the post of Placement Officer after his retirement?

The Court applied the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, under which issues actually decided, or grounds that might and ought to have been raised in earlier proceedings, cannot be reopened in subsequent proceedings under Article 226.

It applied the rule that recruitment must ordinarily proceed according to the eligibility conditions notified in the advertisement; the criteria cannot be altered mid-process, since doing so would undermine fairness, transparency, and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The Court further relied on the principle that the employer or appointing authority is competent to prescribe essential qualifications and that courts cannot rewrite eligibility conditions or decide equivalence in judicial review.

Interim orders merge into the final judgment and cannot survive dismissal of the substantive proceeding.

Retrospective promotion or appointment after retirement is impermissible absent a specific enabling provision, and promotion ordinarily takes effect only upon its grant and assumption of the duties of the promotional post.

The Court held that the petitioner’s central challenge had already been rejected in W.P.(C) No.19653 of 2010, where it was determined that he did not possess the qualification prescribed in the 2010 advertisement and that the selection had to proceed on the basis of the criteria existing when the recruitment commenced.

The subsequent dismissal of the writ appeal and SLP, together with the limited scope of the review order, left that determination undisturbed.

Accordingly, the petitioner could not use later representations to revive a stale claim or indirectly challenge the appointment of opposite party No.5.

The 2014 Government communication could not retrospectively alter the eligibility conditions applicable to the 2010 recruitment.

The Court reasoned that changing the qualifications after commencement of the selection process would prejudice persons who might have applied under the revised criteria and would violate the requirements of non-arbitrariness and transparency.

The Government communication also did not itself constitute an appointment order or override the authority of OUAT’s competent appointing body to prescribe qualifications.

The order in O.J.C. No.9987 of 1998 only directed consideration for a suitable post when a vacancy arose; it did not confer a right to appointment to any particular future post.

The petitioner accepted appointment as Junior Assistant pursuant to that order, accepted subsequent promotions, and served until retirement as Section Officer.

The Placement Officer post was a single post intended to be filled by direct recruitment, not a promotional post in the petitioner’s ministerial hierarchy.

Since the petitioner had retired and had never assumed the duties of Placement Officer, retrospective appointment or financial benefits could not be granted.

It declined to interfere with the OUAT Office Order dated 26 December 2015 appointing opposite party No.5 as Placement Officer and with the Vice-Chancellor’s order dated 15 December 2020 rejecting the petitioner’s representations.

The Court held that the petitioner’s challenge was barred by the finality of the earlier proceedings, that the 2014 qualification proposal could not be applied retrospectively, that the 1999 order did not entitle him to appointment as Placement Officer, and that retrospective appointment after retirement was unavailable.

There was no order as to costs.