A suit for permanent injunction becomes infructuous upon the admitted dispossession of the plaintiff during pendency.

The Appellants (original plaintiffs) filed a suit in 2014 for permanent injunction to restrain the Respondents from dispossessing them from agricultural land in Village Burari, Delhi, claiming cultivatory possession for over 30 years

The Respondents contested the suit, asserting ownership via a 1957 Sale Deed and claiming they had been in continuous possession since purchase

During the pendency of the suit, the Appellants’ application for an interim injunction was dismissed in October 2018

Subsequently, in January 2019, the Appellants moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, alleging they were forcibly dispossessed on 07.11.2018. They sought to amend the plaint to include a prayer for restoration of possession

Simultaneously, the Appellants filed a separate suit for restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act

The Trial Court (ADJ) dismissed the amendment application and the original suit, holding that the suit for injunction had become infructuous due to the admitted dispossession

The Appellants challenged this dismissal via the present Regular First Appeal

1. Whether a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter becomes infructuous if the plaintiff is admittedly dispossessed of the suit property during the pendency of the litigation.

2. Whether an amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to seek restoration of possession should be allowed when the plaintiff has already instituted a parallel remedy under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for the same relief.

The court primarily applied Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC regarding the amendment of pleadings, which generally allows amendments to avoid multiplicity of proceedings but prohibits those that completely change the original cause of action or are redundant

It relied on Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides a summary remedy for restoration of possession to persons dispossessed without their consent other than in due course of law

The court further considered Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, which stipulates that an injunction cannot be granted when an equally efficacious relief is obtainable by any other usual mode of proceeding

The court reasoned that the primary object of a permanent injunction suit is the protection of existing possession; once the Appellants admitted they were no longer in possession as of 07.11.2018, the substratum of the injunction suit disappeared

Regarding the amendment application, the court observed that while subsequent events can be incorporated to mould relief, the Appellants had already elected a specific statutory remedy by filing a separate suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act

Permitting an amendment in the original suit to seek the same relief would lead to a "multiplicity of litigations" and a trial of "identical" plaints

The court noted that the proposed amendment would fundamentally alter the cause of action from "protection of possession" to "recovery of possession," which, in light of the pending Section 6 suit, was unnecessary

Finally, the court held that since there was no finding of the Appellants being in admitted possession at any stage, the suit could not be sustained once dispossession occurred

It held that the suit for permanent injunction became infructuous upon the Appellants' dispossession, as the relief sought (restraining dispossession) could no longer be granted

The court further held that the amendment was rightly rejected because the Appellants had already invoked an alternative, identical remedy under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, and the amendment would have resulted in an entirely different cause of action

All pending applications were disposed of accordingly