A suspension order recording only prima facie satisfaction is not a final finding of misconduct.

The appellant’s service with Raghunathpur Municipality and his claim to permanent absorption as a Sub-Assistant Engineer were the subject of pending proceedings before the Supreme Court.

In August 2023, the Municipality issued a show-cause notice alleging misconduct, including misappropriation in connection with a solid-waste-management project and misuse of the designation of Assistant Engineer.

It first suspended him on 11 August 2023.

In WPA 20872 of 2023, the High Court kept that suspension in abeyance and directed the Municipality to consider the appellant’s reply and give him a hearing before passing a fresh order.

Following a hearing, the Municipality issued a fresh suspension order on 4 September 2023.

The appellant challenged it in WPA 22565 of 2023; the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, treating the suspension order’s observations as tentative rather than conclusive.

The appellant appealed.

The Division Bench also considered that he had separately challenged the first suspension order before the Supreme Court, without disclosing the parallel proceedings to the respective courts.

Whether the fresh suspension order reflected a concluded finding of misconduct or only a prima facie view pending inquiry.

Whether the appellant’s suppression of his parallel proceedings before the High Court and Supreme Court warranted refusal of relief and an award of costs.

Whether the appellant’s claim for subsistence allowance could be determined in this appeal.

The Court applied the principle that suspension is not, by itself, a final determination of misconduct: an employer’s prima facie satisfaction that misconduct may have occurred does not amount to a finding of guilt, and the allegations remain to be decided through the appropriate process.

It also proceeded on the basis that an employer may suspend an employee, including one engaged on a casual basis, where allegations warrant inquiry.

The Court relied on no identified statutory provision or precedent.

It further applied the procedural principle that a litigant who withholds material information or pursues overlapping proceedings without disclosure may be denied discretionary relief.

The Court considered the allegations against the appellant and the Municipality’s consideration of his reply and grant of a personal hearing.

It held that the suspension order’s reference to the appellant’s misconduct and the need for an inquiry did not establish a final conclusion of guilt; the charges required further inquiry and could not be adjudicated in the appeal.

The Court also found that the appellant had pursued challenges to the first suspension order before both the High Court and the Supreme Court without disclosing the parallel proceedings, and concluded that he had not approached either court with clean hands.

Subsistence allowance was not decided because it had not been raised in the writ petition.

It imposed costs of ₹5,000 on the appellant, payable to the Municipality within two weeks and to be used for the rehabilitation of stray dogs.

The Court left the service-status dispute to the Supreme Court, which was already seized of the matter.