A trial court cannot nullify a subsisting injunction in ancillary implementation proceedings.

The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners instituted a suit for specific performance of agreements to sell dated 29.01.2003 and 11.09.2003 concerning agricultural land situated at Arnia. He claimed that, after payment of consideration, possession had been delivered to him and that he had been cultivating the land since 2003. He also relied upon a power of attorney executed by the defendants and a subsequent sale deed executed in favour of his son.

In the suit, the trial court passed an ex parte interim order dated 02.12.2013 restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession. After hearing the parties, the trial court made the interim order absolute by order dated 17.11.2016.

The plaintiff thereafter repeatedly sought implementation of the injunction through police assistance. By order dated 02.12.2021, the trial court rejected the application, reasoning that the revenue entries and possession could not be relied upon because they were based on the power of attorney or agreement to sell, and that the power of attorney had subsequently been cancelled.

The petitioners challenged that order before the High Court.

1. Whether the trial court could, while considering an application for implementation of an interim injunction, effectively nullify or vacate an injunction order that had already been confirmed and made absolute.

2. Whether the trial court was entitled to re-examine the parties’ possession and the validity or effect of the underlying agreements, power of attorney, and revenue entries in ancillary proceedings seeking enforcement of the subsisting injunction.

3. Whether the petitioners were entitled to have the injunction order dated 02.12.2013, as confirmed on 17.11.2016, implemented in accordance with law.

The Court applied the principles governing temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the power to discharge, vary, or set aside an injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC.

The core rule was that an injunction order, once confirmed and made absolute, remains binding unless set aside by a superior court or varied or vacated by the same court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC. In proceedings for implementation or enforcement of such an order, the court cannot travel behind the order, reconsider the merits on which it was passed, or indirectly nullify it.

The interim injunction dated 02.12.2013 was confirmed and made absolute on 17.11.2016, and therefore continued to operate against the parties.

By refusing implementation on the basis of its own assessment of the revenue entries, the plaintiff’s capacity as attorney, cancellation of the power of attorney, and the disputed question of possession, the trial court effectively vacated the subsisting injunction in collateral proceedings.

The High Court held that such an approach was impermissible: unless the injunction was set aside by a superior court or modified under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC, the trial court was required to secure its implementation when an alleged violation was brought to its notice.

The trial court could not revisit the factual and legal controversies underlying the suit while deciding an application for enforcement of the injunction.

It directed the trial court to reconsider and deal with the petitioners’ application seeking implementation of the order dated 02.12.2013, as confirmed by order dated 17.11.2016, in accordance with law.

The respondents were left at liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies against the injunction order itself.