A tribunal may rely on enquiry witnesses afresh when procedural defects are cured by full cross-examination.

The petitioner had worked for approximately 18 years as a junior clerk with the respondent-management. He was suspended on 6 March 1993 and charge-sheeted on 12 March 1993 for allegedly leaving the workplace during duty hours, inciting workers, pasting a provocative notice, stopping work and gheraoing officers, and abusing the Factory Manager.

The petitioner was found guilty in the domestic enquiry and dismissed from service on 5 July 1994.

The Industrial Tribunal subsequently held the enquiry to be unfair/perverse because relevant documents had not been supplied, the enquiry officer had allegedly assisted management witnesses, and the petitioner had not received a proper opportunity to cross-examine most of those witnesses.

After evidence was led afresh, the Tribunal found the misconduct proved and upheld the termination by award dated 22 March 2005 in ID No. 238/1997.

The petitioner challenged that award under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the same witnesses from the defective enquiry had been relied upon, that the management had not reserved the right to lead evidence before the Tribunal, and that he had been victimised for his trade-union activities.

Whether the Industrial Tribunal could rely on the statements of management witnesses who had also appeared in the domestic enquiry after the enquiry had been held perverse on grounds of violation of natural justice.

Whether the management was entitled to lead evidence before the Industrial Tribunal to independently establish the alleged misconduct, and whether doing so caused prejudice to the petitioner.

Whether the Tribunal’s finding of misconduct and its refusal to interfere with the punishment of termination warranted interference by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Whether the petitioner’s allegation of victimisation, based principally on his union activities and the fact that other workers were not charge-sheeted, justified setting aside the award.

The Court applied the principles governing judicial review under Article 226, holding that the High Court does not act as an appellate court over the findings of a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and may interfere only where the decision is arbitrary, perverse, or otherwise legally infirm.

It further applied the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to receive relevant material and a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses; however, a defective domestic enquiry does not preclude the management from proving the misconduct independently before the Tribunal when a proper opportunity of cross-examination is afforded.

The Court also applied the principle that proved misconduct cannot be disregarded merely on sympathetic grounds or solely because comparable action was not taken against other employees.

The Court held that the enquiry had been declared perverse because of procedural unfairness, principally the denial of documents and an effective opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, rather than because the management witnesses’ factual testimony was inherently unreliable.

Once those witnesses were examined before the Tribunal and the petitioner was given a proper opportunity to cross-examine them, the Tribunal was entitled to assess their evidence afresh.

The testimony of B.V. Rao, who stated that the petitioner had urged workers to stop work and had gheraoed officers, supported the allegations; the petitioner had also not challenged the authenticity of the attendance/in-and-out register relied upon by the management.

The Court found no demonstrated inconsistency or infirmity in the evidence and declined to reappreciate it in writ jurisdiction.

It further held that permitting the management to lead evidence before the Tribunal caused no prejudice because the petitioner received a fair opportunity to contest that evidence.

The allegations of union-based victimisation were vague, and the fact that other workers were not charge-sheeted did not negate the petitioner’s independently proved misconduct.

The Court declined to modify or set aside the punishment of termination merely on sympathetic considerations.

The writ petition was dismissed, and the pending application was disposed of.