A waitlisted candidate has no indefeasible right to appointment absent a mandatory recruitment rule.

The applicant, a Scheduled Caste candidate from Puducherry holding B.Tech. and MBA degrees, applied pursuant to the respondent’s notification dated 11 August 2015 for direct recruitment to the post of Upper Division Clerk (“UDC”). Out of 503 notified vacancies, vacancies were earmarked for Scheduled Caste candidates under the applicable reservation scheme.

The applicant was placed at Rank 15 in the provisional SC waiting/reserve list after securing 30.25 marks.

Following certificate verification and the initial offers of appointment, several candidates were absent, rejected, did not join, or subsequently resigned/expired. The respondent thereafter operated the waiting list in phases and made further appointments.

The applicant contended that vacancies remained available in the SC category and that appointments had been issued up to Rank 14 in the SC waiting list; consequently, being Rank 15, he claimed appointment with consequential benefits.

The respondent maintained that only 494 of the 503 notified posts were ultimately filled, that the waiting list had been operated in accordance with available vacancies and applicable orders, and that no candidate junior to the applicant had been appointed. It further argued that the waiting list had ceased to operate after its validity period and that inclusion in a waiting list did not confer an indefeasible right to appointment.

The applicant accordingly filed the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Whether the respondent’s failure to fill the remaining vacancy or vacancies earmarked for Scheduled Caste candidates, despite the availability of eligible waitlisted candidates, was arbitrary, discriminatory, or contrary to the reservation scheme.

Whether a candidate placed in a waiting or reserve list possesses an indefeasible right to appointment against an unfilled vacancy.

Whether the respondent was legally bound to continue operating the waiting list after the relevant validity period or after making appointments against the available vacancies.

The Tribunal applied Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as the jurisdictional basis for the application.

It relied on the principle that mere inclusion in a select or waiting list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment, as reaffirmed in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, Civil Appeal Nos. 2634–2636 of 2013, decided on 7 November 2024.

Relying on State of Karnataka v. Smt. Bharathi S., Civil Appeal No. 3062 of 2023, 2023 INSC 573, and the authorities cited therein, including Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, the Tribunal held that the State is not ordinarily obliged to fill every vacancy unless the applicable statutory rules impose a mandatory obligation; however, any decision not to fill vacancies must be bona fide, non-arbitrary, and non-discriminatory.

The Tribunal also relied on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Karunesh Kumar, Civil Appeal Nos. 8822–8823 of 2022, decided on 12 December 2022, for the proposition that an employer retains reasonable flexibility and discretion in making appointments, subject to judicial interference where the selection process is arbitrary or contrary to law.

The Tribunal accepted that vacancies had arisen during the recruitment process but held that their existence, by itself, did not create an enforceable right in favour of the applicant.

The respondent had operated the waiting list in phases, considered candidates against the vacancies then available, and ultimately decided not to operate it further after the relevant validity period.

The applicant’s claim was based principally on his position at Rank 15 in the SC waiting list and on the alleged shortfall in SC appointments.

Applying Shankarsan Dash, Tej Prakash Pathak, and Bharathi S., the Tribunal held that a waiting-list candidate could claim appointment only if a statutory or governing rule mandated filling the vacancy from that list.

No such mandatory provision was established before the Tribunal.

Further, the record did not demonstrate that any candidate junior to the applicant had been appointed or that the respondent had acted with discrimination or mala fides.

Accordingly, the respondent’s decision to discontinue operation of the waiting list was found legally sustainable.

It held that inclusion in the SC waiting list did not confer an indefeasible right to appointment and that the respondent was not legally obliged to continue operating the waiting list merely because vacancies remained or because the applicant was next in order of merit.

Finding no arbitrariness, discrimination, or violation of a mandatory recruitment rule, the Tribunal dismissed OA/310/01379/2018.

No order was made as to costs.