A widow may represent an HUF as de facto manager where no eligible coparcener can act.

M/s. Kishorilal Vijay Kumar HUF, represented by Smt. Kusum Mour, instituted Title Suit No. 37/2012 seeking eviction of Raichand Bararia from a 450 sq. ft. shop premises at Kedar Road, Guwahati, on the grounds of bona fide requirement for expansion of business and default in payment of rent.

The premises had been let under a tenancy agreement dated 1 April 2008 at a monthly rent of ₹5,321, with rent payable during the first week of every month.

The Trial Court decreed the suit on 19 October 2015, holding the defendant to be a rent defaulter and finding the premises bona fide required by the plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court affirmed the decree on 30 September 2016 in Title Appeal No. 79/2015.

During the revision proceedings, Raichand Bararia died and his legal heirs were substituted as petitioners.

Whether the eviction suit was maintainable when Smt. Kusum Mour, a female Hindu, represented the plaintiff-HUF as its Karta/de facto manager?

Whether the plaintiffs established a continuing bona fide requirement of the suit premises for expansion of the HUF’s business?

Whether the predecessor of the petitioners was a defaulter in payment of rent for April 2011?

Whether documents produced by the plaintiffs after settlement of issues were inadmissible for non-compliance with Order XIII Rule 1(2) CPC?

Whether the plaintiffs’ son could depose without producing specific authority from the HUF, and whether an adverse inference arose from Smt. Kusum Mour’s non-examination?

Whether the concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court disclosed jurisdictional error, perversity, illegality, or material irregularity warranting interference under Section 115 CPC?

The Court applied the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, holding that interference is permissible only where the subordinate court exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or acted illegally or with material irregularity; revision is not a second appeal for reappreciation of evidence.

On HUF representation, the Court held that although a widow may not ordinarily be a Karta under Hindu law, she may act as a de facto manager of an HUF in appropriate circumstances, particularly where the previous male Karta has died and no eligible coparcener is available; this issue ordinarily requires specific pleadings and factual determination.

The Court also applied the contractual rent obligation under Clause 2 of the tenancy agreement, requiring payment in the first week of each month.

It considered Order XIII Rule 1(2) CPC concerning production of documents and held that absence of objection when documents were exhibited was material.

The Court referred to the principles in Shreya Vidyarthi v. Ashok Vidyarthi, Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar-II v. Sandhya Rani Dutta, Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, Madanlal v. Shyamlal, and other authorities cited by the parties, but ultimately decided the matter primarily on the pleadings, evidence, and the restricted scope of Section 115 CPC.

The Court first held that the objection to Kusum Mour’s status as Karta was not specifically pleaded before the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court, or even in the revision petition; the petitioners were therefore not permitted to raise the objection for the first time in revision.

In any event, the record showed that she could represent the HUF as its de facto manager after the death of her husband, and the tenant had himself acknowledged her status and accepted rent through her.

The plea that the HUF’s son had a permanent job in Mumbai did not displace the concurrent finding that the premises were required for expansion of the HUF’s business, rather than solely for the son’s occupation; the Court declined to reappreciate that evidence in revision.

On default, the tenancy agreement required rent to be paid in the first week of the succeeding month. The courts below found that the defendant had not proved timely payment or valid deposit of April 2011 rent and that his own evidence indicated an offer of rent at a time inconsistent with the contractual stipulation.

The objection to late production of documents failed because the defendant had not objected when the documents were exhibited, and no illegality or material irregularity was shown.

The Court further held that the plaintiffs’ son, who claimed personal knowledge of the matter, could depose as a witness without producing separate authority to testify, and that the absence of Kusum Mour from the witness box did not invalidate the plaintiffs’ case in the circumstances.

Since the findings on bona fide requirement and default were supported by evidence and were concurrently recorded by both courts, no revisional interference was warranted.

It upheld the findings that the suit premises were bona fide required for expansion of the plaintiffs’ business and that Raichand Bararia was a defaulter in payment of rent for April 2011.

The objections regarding the plaintiffs’ representation, witness authority, late production of documents, and alleged denial of the opportunity to prove rent deposits did not establish any jurisdictional error, perversity, illegality, or material irregularity under Section 115 CPC.

Accordingly, the civil revision petition was dismissed with costs, and the records were directed to be returned to the courts below.