A writ challenge to a preliminary vacation notice is premature before Section 78 proceedings commence.

The appellants challenged a notice dated 07.05.2026 issued by the Executive Officer of Pillaiyan Arthasama Kattalai, informing them to vacate land in their occupation.

They filed a writ petition seeking certiorarified mandamus against the notice. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 13.08.2026, holding, in substance, that the challenge was premature. The appellants thereafter preferred the present writ appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

The Division Bench noted that the notice merely required the appellants to vacate and stated that, in the event of non-compliance, proceedings under Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act would be initiated.

1. Whether a writ petition was maintainable against the communication dated 07.05.2026 when it was only an initial intimation to vacate and formal proceedings under Section 78 of the HR&CE Act had not yet commenced.

2. Whether the writ appeal should be allowed against the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition as premature.

The Court applied Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, under which alleged encroachment or unauthorised occupation is to be dealt with through formal proceedings initiated by the competent HR&CE authorities.

The prescribed process requires the Assistant Commissioner to inform the Joint Commissioner, who may direct initiation of proceedings; thereafter, notice must be issued and the affected persons must be given an opportunity to appear for enquiry before the Joint Commissioner.

A writ challenge is premature where the impugned communication is only a preliminary intimation and no final or adverse order has yet been passed.

The notice dated 07.05.2026 did not itself evict the appellants or constitute a final determination of their rights. It merely informed them that they should vacate and indicated that further action would follow if they failed to do so.

The Court held that any coercive action would necessarily have to be preceded by the statutory procedure under Section 78, including a further notice and an enquiry before the Joint Commissioner.

Since that procedure had not yet been initiated or completed, the appellants had no immediate cause for invoking writ jurisdiction. The Single Judge was therefore correct in dismissing the writ petition as premature.

It observed that the authorities must follow the procedure contemplated under Section 78 of the HR&CE Act, including issuance of notice and affording an opportunity of enquiry before the Joint Commissioner.

No order as to costs was made, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.