A writ petition challenging SARFAESI measures is not maintainable where an effective statutory appeal exists.

Respondent Canara Bank sanctioned an overdraft facility to respondent company, secured in part by the residential house of Late Prabhat Kumar Verma, a director of the company.

After his death, the petitioners—his parents and brothers—continued to reside in the house; his widow and minor daughter were also legal heirs.

Following an earlier successful challenge to the Bank’s SARFAESI proceedings, the Bank initiated fresh proceedings and obtained an order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act to take possession of the mortgaged property.

The petitioners challenged the Bank’s action before the DRT in S.A. No. 59 of 2023, but the DRT dismissed the securitisation application and interlocutory application on 7 July 2023; the petitioners were thereafter dispossessed.

They sought restoration of possession and challenged the DRT’s order and the Bank’s notices, asserting independent possessory rights and relying, among other matters, on a pending partition suit and attachment proceedings under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993.

The Bank disputed their rights and raised the availability of statutory remedies.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 when the petitioners could challenge the DRT’s order through the statutory appellate remedy under the SARFAESI Act.

2. Whether the petitioners’ claims concerning possession, title, and the effect of the pending civil and recovery proceedings could be determined in this writ proceeding.

Article 226 jurisdiction is ordinarily not exercised where an effective statutory remedy is available; the rule applies with particular force in bank-recovery matters.

The Court relied on PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, Civil Appeal No. 4845 of 2024; Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 1; and United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, for that principle.

The Court noted that the petitioners had a statutory appellate remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, while the Bank also identified a remedy under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 concerning the Recovery Officer’s order.

Disputed questions of title and possession were considered unsuitable for determination in the writ proceeding.

The petitioners’ grievance concerned dispossession pursuant to SARFAESI measures, but the DRT had already dismissed their challenge to those measures.

The Court held that the petitioners could pursue the statutory appellate remedy rather than seek review under Article 226.

Their claims of independent possession, title, and the effect of attachment and pending partition proceedings raised disputed questions and could be taken to the competent statutory forum; the Court therefore declined to decide the merits or the alleged conflict between the attachment and SARFAESI action.

Applying the cited Supreme Court authorities, it found no basis to entertain the writ petition.

It left the petitioners at liberty to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law; any interlocutory applications were also disposed of.