Absence of medical corroboration and failure to frame specific charges vitiates conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 376 (rape) and 341 (wrongful restraint) of the IPC and sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment.

The prosecution alleged that on September 3, 2001, the appellant forcibly raped the victim in his marai (cottage), an act purportedly witnessed by her husband (P.W. 4) and neighbors.

Procedurally, the Trial Court failed to sign the original charge memo, and the successor judge "corrected" it nearly two years later without formally framing or reading over a charge for Section 341 IPC.

Evidence revealed the appellant had filed a criminal case against the victim’s family one day prior to the alleged incident.

The medical examination of the victim found no marks of violence and no spermatozoa.

The court applied Section 211 and 218 of the Cr.P.C., which mandate that a separate charge be framed for each distinct offence.

It applied Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. regarding the court's power to alter or add charges before judgment.

Regarding evidence, the court relied on the principle that while ocular evidence generally prevails, if medical evidence completely rules out the possibility of the ocular version being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved (State of Uttarakhand v. Darshan Singh).

It further observed that documents must be proved by authors or those familiar with the handwriting, deprecating the practice of using "Sankat Mochan" witnesses (clerks) to mark exhibits (Sukhi Yadav v. State of Bihar).

The High Court found the Trial Court's procedure fundamentally flawed as no charge under Section 341 IPC was ever read to the appellant, causing prejudice.

Upon re-evaluating the evidence, the Court noted that P.W. 4 (husband) was likely a hearsay witness rather than an eyewitness.

Crucially, the medical report (Ext. 1) showed no injuries to the victim's private parts or body, and no spermatozoa were found, contradicting the victim’s claim of a struggle and forcible rape.

Furthermore, defense evidence (D.W. 2) showed the appellant was being medically examined for injuries 26 kilometers away shortly after the alleged incident, pursuant to a police requisition made the day before the alleged rape, rendering his presence at the crime scene highly improbable.

The Court concluded the case was a "counterblast" to the appellant's previously filed complaint.

The High Court set aside the Trial Court's judgment of conviction dated May 29, 2004, and the order of sentence dated June 10, 2004. The appellant was acquitted of all charges (Sections 376 and 341 IPC), and his bail bonds were discharged.