Absence of proximate instigation and conscious dying declaration necessitates acquittal in abetment of suicide cases.

The deceased, Alpa, had a love affair with the accused which she discontinued a month prior to the incident due to his nature.

The prosecution alleged that the accused continuously harassed, threatened, and trespassed into her house.

On January 12, 2008, the deceased set herself ablaze after the accused allegedly threatened her on the terrace.

She died on February 27, 2008, due to septicemia from burns.

A dying declaration (Exh. 28) attributed the suicide to the accused’s harassment.

However, the trial court acquitted the accused on January 11, 2012, noting that the deceased’s family members turned hostile, claiming the death was an accident involving a kitchen stove.

The State appealed this acquittal.

Whether the prosecution proved the ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically the existence of instigation or a proximate act by the accused.

Whether the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was reliable enough to sustain a conviction despite conflicting medical endorsements regarding the deceased's consciousness.

The Court applied Section 306 (Abetment of suicide) read with Section 107 (Definition of abetment) of the Indian Penal Code.

It relied on the principle that "instigation" requires a "goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act" as established in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka.

It further applied the "twin test" from Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal: there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement proximate to the time of occurrence; mere allegations of harassment are insufficient without a positive act compelling the victim to commit suicide.

The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish a direct causal link between the accused’s actions and the suicide.

Although a dying declaration existed, the Court noted a fatal discrepancy: the police yadi contained an endorsement by a doctor at 10:30 hrs stating the patient was conscious, but another endorsement at 12:10 hrs—shortly after the declaration was finished—stating she was unconscious and unable to give a statement.

Furthermore, no separate medical certificate of fitness was obtained.

The deceased's mother (P.W. 2) and sister (P.W. 8) turned hostile, testifying that the injuries resulted from a stove accident and that there was family pressure on the deceased to settle in Paris.

The Court reasoned that since the family provided an alternative version (accidental death) and the medical evidence regarding the capacity to give a statement was doubtful, the "instigation" threshold was not met.

It held that the trial court's view was a "possible view" and not perverse.

The Court concluded that in the absence of evidence showing the accused intended to provoke the suicide or performed a proximate act leaving the deceased with no other option, a conviction under Section 306 IPC cannot be sustained.

The presumption of innocence was reinforced by the trial court's acquittal.