Abusive language and vague threats alone do not satisfy the BNS offences of intentional insult or criminal intimidation.

Respondent No. 2 complained that, following a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners and the removal of a fence, the petitioner telephoned him, threatened him with “dire consequences” and used abusive language.

Crime No. 1/2025 was registered at Kuduremukh Police Station under Sections 352 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

Civil suits concerning the property were pending between the parties.

The petitioner sought to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), arguing that the complaint did not disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences and arose from a civil dispute.

Whether the complaint, taken at face value, disclosed the ingredients of intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of peace under Section 352 BNS.

Whether the allegations disclosed criminal intimidation under Section 351(2) BNS.

Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed under Section 528 BNSS.

Section 352 BNS requires an intentional insult accompanied by provocation, with the accused intending or knowing that the provocation is likely to cause a breach of public peace or another offence; actual breach of peace is not necessary.

Under Section 351 BNS, criminal intimidation requires a threat of injury to person, reputation or property, coupled with the requisite intention to cause alarm or to compel an act or omission.

Applying the corresponding principles under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, the Court relied on B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana, which referred to Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P.: abuse alone does not establish intentional insult unless the required intention or knowledge to provoke a breach of peace is shown; the words and their context must be considered.

Under Section 528 BNSS, proceedings may be quashed where, even accepting the allegations in their entirety, the essential ingredients of the offences are absent; the Court must not conduct a mini-trial.

The Court treated the attributed words as abusive and intemperate but found that the complaint disclosed no factual basis for inferring that the petitioner intended or knew the words were likely to provoke respondent No. 2 into breaching the peace or committing another offence.

The allegation of being threatened with “dire consequences” did not specify the threatened injury or identify an act the petitioner intended respondent No. 2 to do or omit, nor did it establish the requisite intention to cause alarm.

The pending property litigation provided relevant context, but was not, by itself, a ground to quash proceedings; the decisive point was that the complaint’s allegations, read as a whole, failed to disclose the statutory ingredients.

It quashed the proceedings arising from Crime No. 1/2025 insofar as they concerned the petitioner, while clarifying that the order did not affect either party’s rights or contentions in the pending civil proceedings.