Acknowledgment after limitation expires cannot extend limitation under Section 18.

The plaintiff alleged that she advanced friendly loans of ₹2,50,000 on 24 February 2016 and ₹1,00,000 on 14 June 2016 to the defendant, aggregating to ₹3,50,000. She further alleged that the defendant deposited ₹1,00,000 into her bank account on 6 September 2021, leaving ₹5,96,078 due with interest. The plaintiff instituted Small Cause Civil Suit No. 390 of 2022 for recovery on 5 August 2022

The defendant applied under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the suit was barred by limitation because the loans became due in 2016 and the alleged acknowledgment/payment in 2021 occurred after expiry of the three-year limitation period. The trial court rejected the plaint as hopelessly time-barred on 1 March 2023. The First Appellate Court confirmed that order on 3 February 2026 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 65 of 2023, leading to the present second appeal

1. Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that the recovery suit was barred by limitation?

2. Whether the defendant’s deposit of ₹1,00,000 on 6 September 2021 constituted an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, capable of extending the limitation period?

3. Whether the issue of limitation required a full trial and evidence regarding alleged acknowledgments in the defendant’s income-tax returns, balance sheets, or accounts?

4. Whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC with the concurrent findings of the courts below?

The Court applied Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, under which a plaint may be rejected where, from the statements contained in the plaint, the suit appears to be barred by law

It applied Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which an acknowledgment of liability extends limitation only when it is made in writing and signed before expiry of the prescribed limitation period

The Court held that, at the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the court must examine the plaint averments and cannot rely on matters not pleaded or on evidence proposed to be led by the plaintiff

It considered A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna, (2002) 2 SCC 642, but found that the decision did not assist the plaintiff in the absence of foundational pleadings regarding a timely acknowledgment

On second appeals, the Court relied on Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, and Jaichand (Dead) through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, for the principle that interference under Section 100 CPC is permissible only where a substantial question of law exists or the findings are perverse, contrary to mandatory law, based on inadmissible evidence, or unsupported by evidence

The Court observed that the alleged loans became due in 2016, while the suit was filed in 2022. Although the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s deposit of ₹1,00,000 on 6 September 2021, the Court held that even if this transaction were treated as an acknowledgment of liability, it occurred after expiry of the applicable three-year limitation period and therefore could not revive or extend limitation under Section 18

The plaint contained no averment of any acknowledgment between 2016 and 2019. The plaintiff’s submission that the defendant might have acknowledged the debt in income-tax returns, balance sheets, or accounts was rejected because those facts were neither pleaded nor part of the plaint, and evidence cannot be introduced to cure the absence of foundational pleadings

Consequently, the issue of limitation could be decided at the threshold on the plaint averments. Since both subordinate courts had concurrently found the suit time-barred, and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate perversity or any substantial question of law, the High Court declined to interfere under Section 100 CPC

It further held that no substantial question of law arose and that the concurrent findings of the courts below were neither perverse nor legally erroneous

The second appeal was therefore dismissed in limine, the orders of the trial court and First Appellate Court were confirmed, and no order was made as to costs