Acquittal affirmed where inconsistent, medically unsupported dying declarations failed to establish cruelty or abetment.

Parul, sister of the complainant, married accused No.1, Yogeshkumar, around 1995 and had two children, Palak and Tarang.

The prosecution alleged that, after several years of marriage, accused Nos.1 and 2 subjected Parul to mental and physical cruelty, while accused Nos.3 and 4 instigated accused No.1.

Following a quarrel on 18.08.2008, Parul and her children went to the accused’s residence at Daramli.

In the early hours of 19.08.2008, Parul allegedly poured kerosene on herself and the children and set them ablaze; Parul and Palak died, while Tarang survived.

An FIR was registered for offences under Sections 498A, 323, 306 and 114 of the IPC, and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

The trial court acquitted all the accused in Sessions Case No.157 of 2008.

The State challenged the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the CrPC.

During the appeal, accused No.2 died and the appeal against him abated.

The Court applied Sections 498A, 306 and 107 of the IPC, holding that conviction for cruelty requires proof of legally cognisable mental or physical cruelty, while Section 306 requires proof of abetment and instigation as contemplated by Section 107.

Statements relating to the cause of death or circumstances of the transaction are relevant under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; however, a dying declaration must be voluntary, truthful, consistent, credible and free from tutoring before it can independently sustain a conviction.

Relying on Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra, the Court noted that a doctor’s fitness certification is not an absolute legal requirement, but the court must assess the declarant’s capacity, voluntariness, consistency and the possibility of tutoring.

Under Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, an appellate court may fully reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but the accused enjoys a reinforced or “double presumption” of innocence, and acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views are possible.

The Court found that the prosecution had not established any specific, reliable instance of cruelty or any proximate act of instigation or abetment by the accused.

Palak’s two statements materially differed: Exhibit 41 referred principally to quarrels between her parents and a mild altercation with her grandfather, whereas Exhibit 44 attributed constant harassment to accused No.2.

Their reliability was further weakened by the medical evidence that Palak had suffered approximately 90–95% burns, was on oxygen and was allegedly not in a condition to speak.

The Court also considered the absence of medical certification, inconsistencies in the statements, the possibility of tutoring, and the history given by surviving child Tarang that Parul had set herself and the children on fire.

The testimony of the complainant and Parul’s parents contained omissions and contradictions, and the complainant’s evidence suggested that the FIR was influenced by disputes concerning cooperation, funeral arrangements and return of ornaments.

The defence evidence and medical history also disclosed Parul’s prior mental-health difficulties, which provided an alternative explanation for the incident.

In light of these deficiencies and the heightened standard applicable to an appeal against acquittal, the trial court’s view was held to be a reasonable one and not perverse.

The dying declaration and associated statement did not inspire sufficient confidence to support conviction, and no illegality, perversity or manifest error was found in the trial court’s judgment.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the order of acquittal was confirmed, the appeal against accused No.2 stood abated due to his death, bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.