Acquittal for electricity theft does not invalidate an independent assessment for unauthorized use.

The petitioner’s father was the registered consumer of electricity supplied by WBSEDCL. The petitioner was alleged to have used the connection unauthorisedly for operating a husking mill. A provisional assessment of Rs. 2,60,896 was made under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and was subsequently confirmed by the assessing officer on 24 September 2004.

On appeal under Section 127, the assessment was reduced to Rs. 2,24,181, which was paid and the electricity supply was restored.

WBSEDCL also lodged a theft-related criminal case on the same factual allegations. The Special Court acquitted the petitioner on 19 December 2014.

Nearly twelve years later, on 20 July 2026, the petitioner filed the writ petition seeking refund of the amount paid, contending that the criminal acquittal nullified the assessment under Sections 126 and 127.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to refund of the amount paid pursuant to the appellate assessment under Section 127 merely because he was acquitted in the criminal theft case arising from the same allegations.

Whether Sections 154(5) and 154(6) of the Electricity Act, 2003 required the civil liability determined under the assessment proceedings to be treated as extinguished when the Special Court acquitted the petitioner and determined no civil liability.

Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on account of unexplained delay and because the claim for refund was in the nature of a time-barred money claim.

Whether the petitioner could maintain the writ petition when the registered consumer was his father and the payment was allegedly made by the father.

The Court applied Sections 126 and 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which govern assessment for unauthorised use of electricity and the statutory appeal against such assessment.

It considered Sections 154(5) and 154(6), under which the Special Court may determine civil liability arising from theft only when theft is established in the criminal proceedings.

Relying principally on Castron Technologies Limited v. The Damodar Valley Corporation & Others, Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 6114 of 2023, decided on 21 November 2024, the Court held that the Special Court acquires jurisdiction to determine civil liability under Section 154(5) only upon a finding that theft of electricity has been committed.

The Court further applied the principle in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 10, that although the Limitation Act does not strictly govern writ proceedings, the statutory limitation period for a civil suit ordinarily provides a reasonable standard for assessing delay under Article 226.

It also noted that unauthorised use may constitute theft, but every instance of unauthorised use does not necessarily amount to theft.

The Court held that the assessment under Sections 126 and 127 concerned unauthorised use of electricity, whereas the criminal case concerned theft, and the two proceedings operated in distinct fields.

Since the Special Court merely acquitted the petitioner and did not find theft to have been committed, there was no occasion for it to determine civil liability under Section 154(5); consequently, Sections 154(5) and 154(6) did not override or invalidate the prior assessment.

The Court also found that the petitioner approached the Court approximately twelve years after the acquittal, without demonstrating any adequate medical or other explanation for the delay.

As the refund claim was essentially a money claim that would have become time-barred in an ordinary civil suit, the writ petition was independently liable to dismissal on the ground of delay and laches.

The earlier coordinate-Bench decisions relied upon by the petitioner were held to be unhelpful because one had been set aside in appeal and the other had been stayed.

The writ petition was also barred by unexplained and inordinate delay.

Accordingly, WPA 17772 of 2026 was dismissed, with no order as to costs.