Acquittal in a consensual-relationship case warrants no interference when the trial court’s view is reasonably possible.

The complainant alleged that Munna had assured her of marriage, lived with her as her husband for about two years, and sexually exploited her; she further alleged that he later arranged to marry elsewhere and threatened her when she objected.

A charge-sheet was filed under Sections 376, 120B, 506 and 313 IPC. The trial court acquitted the accused, finding that the parties had intended to marry and that the proposed marriage broke down amid a dispute concerning land between the accused and the complainant’s father.

The State appealed against the acquittal.

1. Whether the trial court’s acquittal under Sections 376, 120B, 506 and 313 IPC was perverse or otherwise legally unsustainable so as to justify appellate interference.

2. Whether the evidence concerning the parties’ two-year relationship and the circumstances in which the marriage proposal failed warranted setting aside the acquittal.

Under Section 378 CrPC, an appellate court may review and reappreciate the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but must give due weight to the trial court’s findings and the reinforced presumption of innocence following acquittal.

If two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed; interference is warranted where the trial court’s approach is patently illegal, its conclusions are perverse or untenable, or material evidence has been misread or ignored (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka; Babu v. State of Kerala; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat; Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras).

The Court also referred to Martanda Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and Jaspal Singh Kaural v. State of NCT of Delhi concerning consent in consensual relationships and the need for material indicating coercion, misconception or dishonest inducement.

The Court found that the trial court had considered the complainant’s evidence that she and the accused lived together as husband and wife for about two years and that she was willing to marry him; her father’s evidence also indicated that the marriage proposal came from the accused’s side.

The trial court’s conclusion that the marriage proposal failed in the context of the land dispute was, in the High Court’s assessment, a reasonable view of the evidence.

In light of the parties’ prolonged relationship and the principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court found no perversity or other compelling basis to replace the trial court’s assessment with a different view.

The State’s appeal was dismissed summarily.