ACQUITTAL REVERSED: NEGLIGENCE ESTABLISHED DESPITE ABSENCE OF DIRECT EYEWITNESS BY APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRINCIPLE.

A criminal appeal was filed by the State challenging the judgment dated December 24, 2019, by the CMM-04 (North), Delhi, which acquitted the Respondent, Shiv Shankar, for offences under Section 279/304A of the IPC in FIR No. 420/2012.

On December 5, 2012, around 11:00 AM, a two-year-old child, Veer @ Aditya, was allegedly run over by a TATA Ace Truck (DL 1LP 6713) driven by the Respondent in a rash and negligent manner.

The child was declared dead after being taken to SRHC Hospital.

The Respondent and the offending truck were found at the spot by SI Satbir Singh and Const. S.K. Jahangir.

ASI Omender Kumar took over the investigation and registered the FIR based on the statement of the child's father, Ashok Kumar.

The chargesheet was filed, and a charge under Section 279/304A IPC was framed against the Respondent on May 12, 2014, to which he pleaded not guilty.

In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the Respondent admitted that a child came beneath his truck after he started it, but denied guilt, claiming he had parked his vehicle on the side of the road to deliver food.

The CMM acquitted the Respondent, finding that the prosecution witnesses were not eyewitnesses and there was no evidence of rash and negligent driving.

The court applied Section 279 of the IPC, which deals with rash driving or riding on a public way, requiring proof that the accused drove any vehicle on a public way in a manner endangering human life or likely to cause hurt or injury.

It also applied Section 304A of the IPC, pertaining to causing death by negligence.

The court relied on the principles established in *Ravi Kapur vs. State of Rajasthan (2012) 9 SCC 284*, defining the essential elements for an offence under Section 279 IPC: (i) the manner of driving, (ii) rash or negligent driving, and (iii) such driving endangering human life.

The legal maxim "res ipsa loquitur" (things speak for itself) was also considered applicable as a rule of evidence, particularly when the nature of the accident inherently suggests negligence.

The High Court found that the CMM erred in discrediting the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and ignoring the respondent's admission.

The prosecution successfully established that the accident took place with the offending vehicle driven by the Respondent, resulting in the child's death on December 5, 2012.

The testimony of PW1 (father) and PW4 (mother) established their presence and the circumstances of the accident, with PW1 explicitly noting the child being crushed by the truck while sitting roadside.

The court rejected the CMM's reasons for disbelieving PW1, noting his explanation for being home due to illness was unrefuted, and the non-mention of his name on the MLC was not conclusive proof of his absence.

Crucially, the Site Plan, Ex.PW1/F, which was unchallenged and prepared at PW1's instance, depicted the truck deflecting from the main road to the wrong side and entering the 5 ft. empty area where the child was sitting, stopping only after running over the child.

This physical evidence, combined with the unchallenged Site Plan and the Respondent's own admission in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement that the child came beneath his vehicle, strongly indicated negligence.

The court invoked *res ipsa loquitur*, stating that the circumstances themselves spoke of the Respondent's negligence, as his truck went to the wrong side of the road and off the main road without explanation.

Consequently, the impugned judgment of acquittal dated December 24, 2019, was set aside, and the Respondent was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 279/304A IPC.

The case was listed for sentencing on April 1, 2026.